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The persistence of faulty decision making as a primary cause of accidents indicates a
need to train pilots to make better decisions. The purpose of this study was to analyze
scenario-based training’s effectiveness at improving the aeronautical decision making of
collegiate flight students. The researcher scored each participant’s aeronautical decision
making as they completed simulated flights in an advanced aviation training device. The
scores quantified the participants’ aeronautical decision making on seven decisionmaking variables and served as the basis for generating an overall decision making score
for each participant. The experimental group completed a scenario-based aeronautical
decision making treatment between their simulated flights. Chronbach’s alpha analyses
verified the scoring’s internal reliability. Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon tests compared
the participants’ decision making before and after the experimental treatment. Although
there were practical improvements, the differences were not statistically significant. The
practical significance of the results suggests that further research is required.

iv

Table of Contents
Page
Thesis Review Committee .................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iii
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................x
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... xi
Chapter
I

Introduction ..................................................................................................1
Significance of the Study .................................................................4
Statement of the Problem .................................................................5
Purpose Statement ............................................................................5
Hypothesis........................................................................................5
Delimitations ....................................................................................5
Limitations and Assumptions ..........................................................6
Definition of Terms..........................................................................7
List of Acronyms ...........................................................................12

II

Review of the Relevant Literature .............................................................16
Judgment, ADM, and HOTS .........................................................16
SA (Formerly Situational Awareness) ...........................................18
GA Pilots........................................................................................19
ERAU Student Pilots .........................................................21
Expert ADM ..................................................................................21

v

The Novice Pilot ................................................................21
The Accident-Prone Pilot ...................................................22
ADM Training ...............................................................................24
Traditional ADM Training: Informal By-Product of
Experience .........................................................................24
ADM: Behavior Management............................................25
ADM: Problem-Solving Skills and Practice ......................29
Problem-Based Learning ...................................................32
Commercial and Military Training Implementation ..
................................................................................32
GA Training Research ...........................................35
ADM Mnemonics and Acronyms ......................................37
Implementing GA ADM Training .................................................37
FAA CGAR .......................................................................38
FITS ...................................................................................39
Continuing the GA Training Reform Initiative .............................43
Summary ........................................................................................45
III

Methodology ..............................................................................................47
Research Approach ........................................................................47
Design and Procedures .......................................................47
Designating the Control and Experimental Groups ...
................................................................................47
AATD Session Design ...........................................48
AATD Session Procedure ......................................49
Treatment Design ...................................................50

vi

Treatment Procedure ..............................................50
Apparatus and Materials ....................................................52
Population Sample .........................................................................53
Data Collection Device ..................................................................54
Content Validity and Reliability ........................................55
Treatment of the Data ....................................................................56
Descriptive Statistics ..........................................................56
Reliability Testing ..............................................................56
Hypothesis Testing.............................................................57
IV

Results ........................................................................................................58
Descriptive Statistics ......................................................................58
Dependent Variables ..........................................................60
Reliability Testing ..........................................................................66
Hypothesis Testing.........................................................................67
Baseline ADM Performance ..............................................67
Ending ADM Performance ................................................70
Change in ADM for the Control Group .............................72
Change in ADM for the Experimental Group....................75
Comparing Delta between Control and Experimental
Groups ................................................................................77

V

Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ......................................81
Discussion ......................................................................................81
Significance of Results ......................................................81
Experiment Design Factors ................................................81

vii

Impact of Variations in the Sample .......................81
G1000 Proficiency .................................................87
Types of ADM Tested. ..........................................87
In-flight ADM ............................................87
Quick Decisions .........................................88
Decision Points in Each Scenario ..............88
Unintended Decisions ................................91
Maintaining Realism of the Scenario .....................91
Deviations from the Scenario Procedure. ..........................92
AATD-Induced Deviations from the Scenario
Procedure. ..............................................................92
Un-programmed engine Failure .................92
Clouds and Visibility .................................93
Auto-Zoom .................................................93
Operator-Induced Deviations from the Scenario
Procedure ...............................................................93
Treatment Design Factors ..................................................94
Researcher and Instrument Factors. ...................................95
Bias ........................................................................95
Scoring ...................................................................95
Instrument Reliability ............................................96
Impact of Video Quality on Data Collection. ....................97
Conclusions ....................................................................................97
Recommendations ........................................................................100

viii

Further Research and Analysis ........................................100
Suggested Improvements for this Study ..........................100
Experiment Design Factors ..................................101
Treatment Design Factors ....................................101
Bias ......................................................................101
References ........................................................................................................................102
Appendices
A

Permission to Conduct Research .............................................................110

B

Participant Consent Form ........................................................................112

C

Pilot Briefing ............................................................................................114

D

Sample Scoring Sheet ..............................................................................116

E

Sample Debrief Form ...............................................................................118

F

Sample AATD Session Procedure ...........................................................120

ix

List of Tables
Page
Table
1

Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups, First AATD Sessions
................................................................................................................................64

2

Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups, Second AATD
Sessions ..................................................................................................................65

3

Delta of Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups ..................66

4

Overall ADM and Delta Overall ADM for Participants Grouped By Highest
Certification: Control, Experimental, and All........................................................82

5

Overall ADM and Delta Overall ADM for CFI and non-CFI Participants: Control,
Experimental, and All ............................................................................................84

6

Overall ADM Scores and Delta Overall ADM, by Scenario Flown in Rounds One
and Two .................................................................................................................88

7

Practical Comparison of the Control and Experimental Groups, Overall ADM ...99

x

List of Figures
Page
Figure
1

Frasca Mentor Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD) ..............................53

2

Total Time of All Participants. ..............................................................................58

3

Total Time of the Participants, Control and Experimental Groups .......................59

4

Highest Certification Held by the Participants ......................................................60

5

Highest Certification Held by the Participants, Control and Experimental Groups ..
................................................................................................................................60

6

Participants Detected the Problem, Percentage of Decisions ................................62

7

Participants Resolved the Problem, Percentage of Decisions ................................62

8

Participants Reached a Safe Outcome ...................................................................63

9

Round One Problem Comprehended Scores, Control and Experimental Groups .68

10 Round One Problem Projected Scores, Control and Experimental Groups...........68
11 Round One Decision Process Used Scores, Control and Experimental Groups ...69
12 Round One Timely Manner Scores, Control and Experimental Groups ...............69
13 Round One Overall ADM Scores, Control and Experimental Groups ..................70
14 Round Two Problem Comprehended Scores, Control and Experimental Groups 70
15 Round Two Problem Projected Scores, Control and Experimental Groups ..........71
16 Round Two Decision Process Used Scores, Control and Experimental Groups ...71
17 Round Two Timely Manner Scores, Control and Experimental Groups...............72
18 Round Two Overall ADM Used Scores, Control and Experimental Groups ........72
19 Problem Comprehended Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control
Group .....................................................................................................................73

xi

20 Problem Projected Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control Group .
................................................................................................................................73
21 Decision Process Used Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control
Group .....................................................................................................................74
22 Timely Manner Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control Group .....74
23 Overall ADM Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control Group .......75
24 Problem Comprehended Scores in Round One and Round Two for the
Experimental Group ...............................................................................................75
25 Problem Projected Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental
Group .....................................................................................................................76
26 Decision Process Used Scores in Round One and Round Two for the
Experimental Group ...............................................................................................76
27 Timely Manner Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental
Group .....................................................................................................................77
28 Overall ADM Scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental Group ..
................................................................................................................................77
29 Delta Problem Comprehended for the Control and Experimental Groups ............78
30 Delta Problem Projected for the Control and Experimental Groups .....................78
31 Delta Decision Process Used for the Control and Experimental Groups ..............79
32 Delta Timely Manner for the Control and Experimental Groups ..........................79
33 Delta Overall ADM for the Control and Experimental Groups .............................80
34 Total Time and Overall ADM for All Participants in Round One ........................85
35 Total Time and Overall ADM for the Control Participants in Round Two ...........85
36 Total time and Overall ADM for the Experimental Participants in Round Two ...86

xii

1
Chapter I
Introduction
Human error continues to be a leading cause of General Aviation (GA) accidents
and incidents. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 1991) attributed 52% of fatal
GA accidents to pilot error. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) cited
personnel-related causes or factors in 91% of GA accidents in 2006 (NTSB, 2006). The
2010 Nall Report cited 70% of non-commercial fixed-wing accidents in 2009 and 63% of
fatal non-commercial fixed-wing accidents in 2009 as pilot-related (Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association [AOPA], 2010). The 2009 rate of pilot-related accidents – 4.63 per
100,000 flight hours – was consistent with the rate of pilot-related accidents in 2008 and
for the period, 2000-2008 (AOPA, 2009; AOPA, 2010).
The NTSB subdivided personnel-related causes of accidents into human
performance issues such as aircraft control and handling, planning and decision-making,
and use of aircraft equipment (NTSB, 2006). Of the accidents in 2006 for which the
NTSB cited a human performance cause or factor, “the most frequently cited cause/factor
was aircraft handling and control (71%), followed by planning and decision-making
(36%)” (NTSB, 2006, p. 48). The 2010 Nall Report divided pilot-related accidents into
different categories than the NTSB. There were no categories related specifically to
decision-making or judgment, but AOPA discussed decision-making’s impact on many
of the categories it used to describe GA accidents. The report stated that “the judgment
leading to any pilot-related accident could be called into question” (AOPA, 2010, p. 17).
Fuel-management and weather accidents were singled out as being “primarily […]
failures of flight planning and in-flight decision-making” (AOPA, 2010, p. 17). The
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report mentioned the possibility of pilots underestimating the risks associated with the
takeoff phase of flight as a contributing factor to the high number of takeoff phase
accidents (AOPA, 2010). Many maneuvering accidents also resulted from risky
maneuvers initiated at low altitudes. The majority began with a loss of control or stall at
altitudes too low to recover, indicating that “these accidents were more tied to poor
judgment than lack of knowledge or skill” (AOPA, 2010, p. 24).
Decision-making errors may be under-reported, even when they are identified as a
separate category. The 2010 Nall Report did not provide statistics for how many
accidents resulted from poor risk management or faulty aeronautical decision making
(ADM) (AOPA, 2010). The NTSB’s reviews reported that 36% of personnel-related GA
accidents were caused by poor planning or decision-making, but coded each accident
with a single defining event code instead of performing root cause analysis and reporting
each of the causes and factors found (NTSB, 2006). Meanwhile, a recent study (Wright,
2009) applied root cause analysis to 29 fatal accidents involving a popular GA aircraft.
The study concluded that 25 of those accidents could have been avoided using
fundamental risk management procedures or higher order thinking skills (HOTS) such as
ADM and single pilot resource management (Wright, 2009). Only four of those accidents
resulted from the pilot’s faulty aircraft handling (Wright, 2009).
The search for a better method of acquiring judgment in aviation led to a
significant body of research on judgment or ADM and how to train it. Since Jensen’s
1982 study, the premise that judgment can be taught has been accepted in academia and
commercial aviation (FAA, 1991). GA, however, has been slow to accept that judgment
can be taught or come to a consensus on how to train ADM. The FAA has also been slow
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to provide guidance on how to provide ADM training. Much of the guidance the FAA
provided had not been updated as recently as the early 2000s (“FAA-Industry,” 2003).
Significant efforts to improve formal ADM training in GA include projects by the
FAA Center For General Aviation Research (CGAR), the FAA Industry Training
Standard (FITS) program, and the Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE).
CGAR is a consortium of aviation universities conducting research to make significant
improvements in safety and efficiency for GA air transportation (CGAR, 2005). The
FITS program is a collaboration of FAA, industry, and the FAA Center of Excellence for
GA. FITS formed with a mission to improve safety by reducing human error in GA with
a new training philosophy that accelerates the acquisition of higher-level judgment and
decision-making skills (FITS Master Instructor Syllabus, 2006). Goals include
developing adaptive training and industry standards for the GA community (FAAIndustry Training Standards [FITS] program plan, 2003). SAFE is an organization of
aviation educators “fostering professionalism and excellence in aviation through
continuing education, professional standards, and accreditation” (“About SAFE,” 2012,
para. 1). SAFE’s Mission Statement states that they seek to “create a safer environment
through enhanced education” (“Vision & Mission Statement,” 2012, Mission Statement,
para. 1).
New training strategies that emphasize ADM and other mental skills in GA
training have been proposed as the key to meaningfully reforming the entire GA training
paradigm (SAFE, 2011a). GA flight training remained mostly unchanged from the
maneuvers-based focus of the Civilian Pilot Training (CPT) program as recently as 2009.

4
Meanwhile GA accident rates – particularly for decision-making, human error accidents –
remained stagnant, illustrating the need to reform GA training (Wright 2009).
FITS researchers argued that implementing a scenario-based training (SBT)
paradigm in GA training was imperative to better prepare GA pilots because the flight
environment is becoming increasingly challenging as well (“FITS Master,” 2006). Higher
performance technologically advanced aircraft (TAA) are increasingly putting pilots with
less experience and training into situations that require flight management and decisionmaking skills normally expected from air transport pilot (ATP) certificated pilots (“FITS
Master,” 2006). Evolution of technology in GA aircraft such as displays and automation
has rapidly outpaced training programs and the guidance, standardization, and
certification (GSC) provided by the FAA. This increasing disparity exacerbates the
current GA training paradigm’s deficiency in teaching adequate ADM (“FITS Master,”
2006).
Significance of the Study
Improving the ADM of GA pilots would have a significant impact on the safety of
individual GA pilots and on the health of the greater GA community. Faulty ADM
contributed to a significant percentage of past fatal GA accidents; improving ADM
ability in GA pilots could prevent many future fatal GA accidents (“FAA-Industry
Training Standards (FITS) Program Plan,” 2003; Wright, 2009). Improved GA safety
would have the additional benefit of improving the general public’s perception of GA
safety which would enable GA growth (Wright, 2009).
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Statement of the Problem
Human errors in judgment continue to be a leading cause of aviation accidents
and incidents while GA accident rates have failed to improve significantly during the last
decade (AOPA, 2010). Stagnant accident rates indicate that the current training system in
GA has reached the limits of its usefulness for training safer pilots. The persistence of
faulty decision making as a primary cause of human error and pilot-related accidents
indicates a specific need to train pilots to make better decisions (SAFE, 2011a). Past
research has hypothesized that ADM can be taught, and is not merely a by-product of
experience (FAA, 1991; Jensen, 1982; “FITS Master,” 2006). However, the majority of
GA has not yet implemented an effective method of teaching ADM despite a clear need
for pilots to improve their ADM skills (SAFE, 2011a).
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to analyze the effectiveness of scenario-based
ADM training in improving ADM in collegiate flight students.
Hypothesis
There was a difference in demonstrated ADM between pilots who received
scenario-based ADM training and pilots who did not receive scenario-based ADM
training, for flight students enrolled in a baccalaureate program at the Daytona Beach
campus of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU).
Delimitations
Delimitations for this study included limitations on time and population. The
researcher completed the experimental portion of this study entirely within the Fall 2011
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semester. The population for this study was limited to ERAU student pilots, solicited
from various class sections and student organizations.
Limitations and Assumptions
Budget was a major limitation of the study, limiting the number of participants the
researcher could include, and the scope of the treatment the researcher could provide.
Time was another major limitation of the study. Also, the fact that one researcher
conducted the entire experiment, including the training and the scoring, made the
possibility of bias a limitation of the study.
The self-selected nature of the sample was another limitation of the study, as was
the diversity of experience levels in the sample. The original selection criteria for
participants limited the participants to those with fewer than 500 hours of total flight time
logged and who held at least a private pilot certificate but did not hold any flight
instructor certificates. However, the small number of participants who fit the original
selection criteria motivated the researcher to include all willing participants. Including all
the participants meant accepting a wider range of experience levels in the sample to
include student pilots as well as certificated flight instructors (CFIs).
Assumptions of this study included the ability of all parties to understand and
communicate effectively in English; English was not the first language for some of the
participants but every effort was made to ensure mutual understanding. It was assumed
that the researcher was able to accurately assess the participants’ decision making
throughout the experiment. This study also assumed that the participants answered
debrief questions honestly and refrained from discussing the experiment with each other
between sessions, as requested by the researcher.
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Definition of Terms
Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD): a fixed-base flight simulator
equipped with full digitally-loaded flight controls, an instrument
panel, and a video screen (Frasca International, Inc., 2010).
Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM): “A systematic approach to the mental
process used by aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best
course of action in response to a given set of circumstances” (FAA,
1991, p. ii).
Active Pilot: A pilot who holds both a pilot certificate and a valid medical
certificate issued within the last 25 months (NTSB, 2011a).
Attitude:

“A personal motivational predisposition to respond to persons,
situations, or events in a given manner that can, nevertheless, be
changed or modified through training. A sort of mental shortcut to
decision making” (FAA, 1991, p. ii).

Attitude Management: “The ability to recognize hazardous attitudes in oneself
and the willingness to modify them as necessary through the
application of an appropriate antidote thought” (FAA, 1991, p. ii).
FAA Center For General Aviation Research (CGAR): A consortium of aviation
universities conducting research to make significant improvements
in safety and efficiency for GA air transportation (CGAR, 2005).
Crew Resource Management (CRM, formerly Cockpit Resource Management):
“In multiperson crew configurations, the effective use of all
personnel and material assets available to a flight crew. CRM
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emphasizes good communication and interpersonal relationship
skills” (FAA, 1991, p. ii).
Decision Process Used: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical
decision making; describes whether the participant’s actions
evidenced a systematic approach in the decision-making process
(FAA, 1991).
FAA Industry Training Standard (FITS): The FITS program is a collaboration of
FAA, industry, and the Center of Excellence for General Aviation.
Goals include developing adaptive training and industry standards
for the GA community (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS]
Program Plan,” 2003).
Headwork:

Mental work “required to accomplish a conscious, rational thought
process when making decisions. Good decision making involves
risk identification and assessment, information processing, and
problem solving” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).

Higher Order Thinking Skills (HOTS): Analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.
Levels of cognition which are “essential to judgment, ADM, and
critical thinking” (FAA, 2008a, p. 2-5).
Judgment:

“The mental process of recognizing and analyzing all pertinent
information in a particular situation, a rational evaluation of
alternative actions in response to it, and a timely decision on which
action to take” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
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Margin of Safety: “The difference between pilot capabilities and task
requirements” (FAA, 1991, p. 17).
Overall ADM: A numerical score calculated by the researcher to quantify a
participant’s aeronautical decision making ability.
Personal Checklist: The checklist of “basic principles that cannot be compromised
[including] what not to do” (FAA, 1991, p. 23) The IMSAFE
checklist is an example of a personal checklist (FAA, 1991, p. 24).
Personality: “The embodiment of personal traits and characteristics of an
individual that are set at a very early age and extremely resistant to
change” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
Poor Judgment Chain: “A series of mistakes that may lead to an accident or
incident” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
Problem-Based Learning (PBL): Lessons structured to confront students with
real-world problems and force them to reach realistic solutions by
practicing problem-solving skills (FAA, 2008a). Variations of PBL
include SBT, collaborative problem-solving, and case study (FAA,
2008a).
Problem Comprehended: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical
decision making analogous to Endsley’s (2000) Level 2 SA,
Comprehension; refers to the participant’s ability to integrate
“multiple pieces of information and a determination of their
relevance to the person’s goals” (Endsley, 2000, p. 4).
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Problem Detected: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision
making analogous to Endsley’s (2000) Level 1 SA, Perception;
refers to the “perception of cues [and] needed information”, or the
participant’s ability to perceive a problem (Endsley, 2000, p. 3).
Problem Projected: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision
making analogous to Endsley’s (2000) Level 3 SA, Projection;
refers to the ability to “forecast future situation events and
dynamics” (Endsley, 2000, p. 4).
Problem Resolved: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision
making; describes whether the participant’s reaction to a problem
adequately addressed the risk associated with that problem.
Risk Management: “The part of the decision making process which relies on
situational awareness, problem recognition, and good judgment to
reduce risks associated with each flight” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
Risk Elements: “The four fundamental risk elements are the pilot, the aircraft, the
environment, and the type of operation that comprise any given
aviation situation” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
Safe Outcome: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision
making; describes whether the participant’s reaction to a problem
returned the flight to a state in which “the possibility of harm to
persons or of property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or
below, an acceptable level” (International Civil Aviation
Organization [ICAO], 2009, p. 2-2).
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Scenario-Based Training (SBT): “A training system that uses a highly structured
script of real-world experiences to address flight training
objectives in an operational environment” (“FITS Master,” 2006,
p. 5).
Situation Awareness (SA, formerly Situational Awareness): “The accurate
perception and understanding of all the factors and conditions
within the four fundamental risk elements that affect safety before,
during, and after the flight” (FAA, 1991, p. iii). Also, “the
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of
time and space, comprehension of their meaning and the projection
of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 2000, p. 3)
Skills and Procedures: “The procedural, psychomotor, and perceptual skills used
to control a specific aircraft or its systems. They are the stick and
rudder or airmanship abilities that are gained through conventional
training, are perfected, and become almost automatic through
experience” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE): An organization of aviation
educators that works with industry partners and the FAA to
provide aviation education resources; goals include fostering
professionalism, excellence, and safety (“About SAFE,” 2012).
Stress:

“The body’s nonspecific response to demands placed on it,
whether those demands are pleasant or unpleasant” (FAA, 1991, p.
17).
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Stress Management: “The personal analysis of the kinds of stress experienced
while flying, the application of appropriate stress assessment tools,
and other coping mechanisms” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
Timely Manner: A metric used to quantify a participant’s aeronautical decision
making; describes whether the participant “execute[d] a suitable
course of action within the time frame permitted by the situation”
(Jensen, 1982, p. 64).
List of Acronyms
3P

Perceive, Process, Perform

5 Ps

Plan, Plane, Pilot, Passengers, Programming

AATD

Advanced Aviation Training Device

ACT

Aircrew Coordination Training

ADM

Aeronautical Decision Making

AFD

Airport Facility Directory

AOPA

Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association

AQP

Advanced Qualification Program

ASI

Air Safety Institute (formerly the AOPA Safety Foundation)

ATP

Air Transport Pilot

CFI

Certificated Flight Instructor

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CGAR

Center For General Aviation Research

CPT

Civilian Pilot Training

CRM

Crew Resource Management
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DECIDE

Detect, Estimate, Choose, Identify, Do, Evaluate

DESIDE

Detect, Estimate, Set safety objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate

DOT

Department of Transportation

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FATE

Fly the airplane, Assess the situation, Take action, Evaluate (a
Northwest Airlines ADM model)

FITS

FAA-Industry Training Standards

FTD

Flight Training Device

FOR-DEC

Facts, Options, Risks & Benefits, Decision, Execution, Check

GA

General Aviation

GAJSC

General Aviation Joint Steering Committee

GAMA

General Aviation Manufacturers Association

GPS

Global Positioning System

GSC

Guidance, Standardization, and Certification

HAL

High Altitude Lab

HOTS

Higher Order Thinking Skills

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IMSAFE

Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, Eating

IFR

Instrument Flight Rules

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

IP

Instructor pilot

LCD

Liquid Crystal Display
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LOFT

Line Oriented Flight Training

MBT

Maneuver-Based Training

MFD

Multi-Function Display

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

PASS

Problem identification, Acquire information, Survey strategy,
Select strategy

PAVE

Pilot in command, Aircraft, enVironment, and External pressures

PBL

Problem-Based Learning

PIC

Pilot In Command

PJ

Poor Judgment

POH

Pilot’s Operating Handbook

PTS

Practical Test Standards

RPM

Revolutions Per Minute

SA

Situation Awareness

SAFE

Society of Aviation and Flight Educators

SBT

Scenario-Based Training

SHOR

Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options, Response

SOAR

Situation, Options, Act, Repeat

SRM

Single Pilot Resource Management

TAA

Technologically Advanced Aircraft

UND

University of North Dakota

VFR

Visual Flight Rules

15
VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions

VOR

Very High Frequency (VHF) Omnidirectional Radio range
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
Research into ADM began with developing several key concepts. What
eventually became known as ADM was first called judgment. Early research investigated
the correlation between judgment and experience, testing the traditional assumption that
good judgment developed naturally as a by-product of gaining experience. Other research
sought to define expert ADM while still more research identified the component
behaviors and mental skills (such as risk management, HOTS, and situation awareness
[SA]) associated with expert ADM. Analysis of accident statistics throughout the
evolution of ADM training served to indicate how effective different training
methodologies were (FAA, 1991).
Judgment, ADM, and HOTS
Jensen and Benel (as cited in Diehl, 1992) developed a taxonomy of human error
that separated decisional task errors from procedural and perceptualmotor errors. They
defined decisional errors as errors in mental processes such as planning and evaluation,
and emphasized judgment’s association with the “complex cognitive processes involved
in human decision making” (Diehl, 1992, p. 5). Analysis of aircrew errors from major
accidents showed that decisional errors constituted 52%, 56%, and 53% of aircrew errors
made in GA, airline, and military accidents respectively (Diehl, 1992).
Researchers later began referring to decisional tasks as judgment, or decisional
judgment (Jensen, 1982; Diehl, 1992). Jensen (1982) presented a working definition of
judgment that applied to aviation:
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(1) The ability to search for and establish the relevance of all available
information regarding a situation, to specify alternative courses of action, and to
determine expected outcomes from each alternative.
(2) The motivation to choose and authoritatively execute a suitable course of
action within the time frame permitted by the situation, where: (a) “Suitable” is an
alternative consistent with societal norms; (b) “Action” includes no action, some
action, or action to seek more information. (p. 64)
Jensen’s definition of judgment described it as a combination of many complementary
mental functions and incorporated both cognitive and motivational components. Other
common terms for this combination of mental functions included “headwork” and
“staying ahead of the aircraft” (Jensen, 1982). The FAA has since defined judgment as
“the mental process of recognizing and analyzing all pertinent information in a particular
situation, a rational evaluation of alternative actions in response to it, and a timely
decision on which action to take” (FAA, 1991, p. iii).
Over time, ADM became the more common term used to describe these mental
tasks. The FAA defined ADM as “a systematic approach to the mental process used by
aircraft pilots to consistently determine the best course of action in response to a given set
of circumstances” (FAA, 1991, p. ii). The FAA’s definition of ADM shared many
characteristics with Jensen’s earlier definition of judgment, although the FAA’s
definition simplified Jensen’s (1982) itemized list of mental tasks as “the mental process”
(FAA, 1991, p. iii). An understanding of this “mental process” was developed over many
years of research.
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Bloom’s research on the cognitive domain of learning provided valuable insight
into the mental processes associated with ADM. Specifically, Bloom’s taxonomy of the
cognitive domain gave aviation researchers an accurate, theoretical description of those
mental processes (FAA, 2008a). Researchers refined the definition of ADM using the
taxonomy’s more complex levels of thinking, known as the HOTS. Bloom’s taxonomy
described six levels of thinking behaviors that progressed along a continuum from simple
to complex: knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation
(FAA, 2008a). Analysis involved recognizing, examining, and understanding information
from the environment. Synthesis involved combining information into a new and
integrated whole. Evaluation involved judging the benefits and disadvantages of an idea
or phenomenon (FAA, 2008a). HOTS were so essential to judgment and decision-making
that the FAA used HOTS to partially define ADM for aviation instructors (FAA, 2008a).
SA (formerly Situational Awareness)
Research into the decision-making process included investigations into a related
mental process known as SA (formerly situational awareness). Endsley (2000) defined
SA as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and
space, comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near
future” (p. 3), or more simply as “knowing what is going on around you” (p. 2). Her
Theoretical Underpinnings of Situation Awareness: A Critical Review provided an
overview of the SA construct and associated terms (Endsley, 2000).
Endsley (2000) explained that making a decision, like any other task, was enabled
by accurate SA. The relationship between SA and ADM was more probabilistic than a
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direct correlation. High SA increased the probability of successful ADM, but did not
guarantee it (Endsley, 2000).
Endsley (2000) divided SA into three levels, with each level enabling the next.
Level 1 SA, perception, involved distinguishing important information from the
environment via a sensory organ (Endsley, 2000). Level 2 SA, comprehension, involved
combining and interpreting perceived information to derive meaning about the current
situation (Endsley, 2000). Level 3 SA, projection, described the ability to predict the
future state of a situation based on an understanding of the current situation (Endsley,
2000).
Endsley and Garland (2000) reported that SA was a “considerable challenge in
[GA] as GA pilots are frequently less experienced and less current than operators for
major airlines” (p. 357). They observed that a common SA error in low experience GA
pilots was a tendency to overestimate their skill level and underestimate the severity or
risk of a situation. There is a need to improve GA pilots’ SA, as Endsley and Garland
(2000) discussed in their paper, Pilot Situation Awareness Training in General Aviation.
GA Pilots
GA pilots need improved ADM training in order to improve GA safety. GA
includes all aviation except military and scheduled commercial operations (General
Aviation Manufacturers Association [GAMA], 2011). GA pilots fly aircraft ranging from
two-seat trainers to long-range jets. GA pilots have varying levels of certifications and
hours logged, and generally do not receive as much recurrent training as military or
commercial pilots (Endsley & Garland, 2000). GA also serves as the main training
environment for future commercial airline pilots (GAMA, 2011).
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GA suffered the highest accident rates in civil aviation in the last decade (NTSB,
2012). The overall accident rate remained at around six accidents per 100,000 flight
hours, and the fatal accident rate remained at around one accident per 100,000 flight
hours (NTSB, 2011a). By comparison, accident rates for Part 121 operations
continuously improved over the last decade and dropped to 0.152 and 0.006 accidents per
100,000 flight hours for total and fatal accidents, respectively, in 2009 (NTSB, 2011b).
When the NTSB added GA Safety to its Most Wanted List, it noted that the causes of
current GA accidents continued to repeat the causes of historical GA accidents (NTSB,
2012).
Meanwhile, the GA pilot population has been shrinking. There were 532,177
active pilots in 2000, compared to 494,177 active pilots in 2011 (NTSB, 2011a). The
number of pilot certificates issued annually declined for all certificate categories. For
example, private pilot certificates issued declined from 27,223 in 2000 to 13,457 in 2010
(General Aviation Manufacturers Association [GAMA], 2011). Commercial certificates
issued declined from 11,813 in 2000 to 5,774 in 2010 (GAMA, 2011).
The NTSB noted an overall decline in the number of hours flown in GA since
2000 (NTSB, 2011a). There was a sharp decline in hours flown from 2002 to 2003, likely
because of the restrictions imposed on GA after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Whatever
the reason, hours flown never recovered to pre-2001 levels and dropped sharply again
from 2007 to 2009, most likely as a result of economic factors (NTSB, 2011a). Data
collected by GAMA shows that the downward trends in GA activity since 2000 were a
continuation of negative trends begun in preceding decades (2011).
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ERAU student pilots. Enrollment at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University’s
Daytona Beach campus was 4,496 in fall of 2010 (“Enrollment,” 2012). The student body
included 1,101 students enrolled in the B.S. of Aeronautical Science degree program and
275 enrolled in the B.S. of Aeronautics degree program; these two degree programs
included all of ERAU’s flight students (“Enrollment,” 2012). International students from
99 foreign countries made up 14% of the Daytona Beach campus population (“Student
Demographics,” 2012). The average age of students at the Daytona Beach campus was 21
years old, although some were as young as 16 and many students were in their 20s and
30s (the population included many veterans, for example) (“Student Demographics,”
2012). The population was mostly male, as is typical in the aviation industry; only 17%
of the residential campus students were female (“Student Demographics,” 2012).
Expert ADM
Tradition associated good judgment so strongly with experience that aviation
researchers based their definitions of good ADM on the ADM exhibited by an
experienced – or expert – pilot.
The novice pilot. To define expert ADM, researchers first had to distinguish
between novice and expert pilots. The term novice pilot has been used differently by
various researchers to describe a relatively inexperienced pilot. Beringer and
Schvaneveldt (2002) categorized pilots as novice or experienced by using overall flight
time as a measure of experience, which is a traditional but flawed measurement. Deitch
(2001) used novice pilot and student pilot, a person training to become a private pilot,
synonymously. Kobus, Procter, Bank, and Holste (2000) defined novice and expert by
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measuring their population sample against itself; the median experience level was used as
the break point between novice and expert.
Other researchers distinguished novices from experts based on mental
capabilities. Wiggins and O’Hare (2003) distinguished novice pilots from expert pilots
according to “individual differences […] in their capacity to recognize and respond
appropriately to deteriorating […] conditions” and further qualified expert pilots by
saying “experts outperform novices in the capacity to acquire information” (p. 337-338).
Endsley and Garland (2000) described differences in SA between groups of pilots with
different experience levels. They compared GA pilots (approximately 720 hours
experience) to airline pilots (approximately 6,000 hours experience) and to commercial
airline check airmen (approximately 12,000 hours experience). They reported that more
experienced pilots demonstrated increasing levels of preflight preparation and more focus
on understanding and projection – more effective SA that enabled more successful ADM.
Endsley and Garland concluded that SA training that addresses SA problems typical of
low-experience GA pilots should be effective at improving SA and therefore ADM.
The accident-prone pilot. Understanding expert ADM also required research on
faulty ADM, such as the ADM that causes a pilot to have an accident. Adams, Hamilton,
Koonce, and Hwoschinsky (2002) completed a study that analyzed surveys from 4,000
pilots to develop an index that could classify a pilot as high-risk or accident-prone. Their
index was successful at predicting whether a pilot within their population sample had an
accident or not (their population sample included pilots who had an accident and control
pilots whose records were accident-free). In developing the index, they were able to
characterize the ADM styles of both accident-prone and accident-free pilots. They
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concluded that high-risk or accident-prone pilots were more likely to “expose themselves
to unsafe flying experiences, feel time pressure when making decisions, have a false
sense of their ability to handle the situation, and not review alternative options or
solutions” (Adams et al., 2002, p. 948).
An NTSB review of GA accidents led to a profile of GA pilots most likely to have
accidents (Endsley & Garland, 2000). The greatest number of accidents involved “pilots
between 35 to 39 years of age with between 100 to 499 hours total time who were
engaged in personal flying” (Wells, 1992, as cited in Endsley & Garland, 2000, p. 2).
Within the period from 100 to 499 hours total time, pilots with about 100 hours total time
or who were 50 to100 hours beyond the private-pilot certification or instrument-rating
were particularly accident-prone. Pilots who were recently certificated tended to
overestimate their capabilities and put themselves in riskier situations (Trollip & Jensen,
1991, as cited in Endsley & Garland, 2000). Endsley and Garland concluded that GA
pilots who fit this profile were particularly receptive to, and especially needful of,
specialized SA and ADM training.
Although the typical accident-pilot profile described a low-time private pilot who
may or may not hold an instrument rating, pilots with additional flight time and
certificates made up a significant percentage of accident pilots. Of the non-commercial
fixed-wing GA accidents in 2009, 24% involved commercial pilots and 13% involved
ATPs (AOPA, 2010). A CFI was on board in 21% of those accidents (AOPA, 2010).
Lethality of accidents was relatively constant for all levels of pilot certification involved
in non-commercial fixed-wing accidents, with the exception of student pilots whose
lethality rate was about one-quarter that of the other certification levels (AOPA, 2010).
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Of the non-commercial helicopter GA accidents in 2009, 63% involved commercial
pilots, 13% involved ATPs, and a CFI was on board in 51% of those accidents (AOPA,
2010).
ADM Training
Using expert ADM as the goal for new ADM training programs, researchers
examined traditional ADM training methods. Researchers developed new ADM training
programs that focused on behavior management and on a combination of problemsolving skills and practice.
Traditional ADM training: informal by-product of experience. Aviation first
realized the extent of pilots’ weaknesses in decision-making, communication, and
coordination when cockpit voice recorders and flight data recorders were first used in
accident investigations in the 1970s (Diehl, 1992). This discovery prompted the FAA and
industry to develop formal decision-making training programs. At the time, civilian flight
training remained unchanged from the CPT program implemented in advance of World
War Two (Wright, 2009). The CPT training program was maneuvers-based with
eligibility for certification defined by performance of those maneuvers within minimum
standards and accumulation of minimum amounts of training time. Completion of
training meant passing the FAA’s knowledge and practical tests (Diehl, 1992). Judgment
was expected to develop as a natural by-product of experience after the check ride
(Jensen, 1982). Many studies revealed a correlation between experience and higher
quality decision-making (Schriver, Morrow, Wickens, & Taulleur, 2008).
Adams (1992b) explained how ADM was thought to develop in traditional flight
training. Traditional training through experience enabled pilots to develop problem-
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solving ability first by applying rote procedures to handle a situation that had been
covered in training (Adams, 1992b). Novice pilots then developed a store of procedural
knowledge from encountering real-world problems and operational constraints (Adams,
1992b). After 1,000 to 10,000 hours, an expert pilot could apply responses quickly, based
on similar past experiences and could begin to integrate knowledge learned from past
experiences into solutions to solve novel situations (Adams, 1992b).
Despite a correlation between improved ADM and increasing flight experience,
experience alone had not been proven as the most effective method for acquiring
judgment. Scholarly research and accident statistics showed that a significant percentage
of accidents involved pilots with higher certifications and more experience (AOPA,
2010). Training ADM informally as a by-product of experience was no longer adequate,
as evidenced by accident investigations and statistics (Diehl, 1992).
Industry researchers began developing formal ADM training programs. Gaining
judgment through experience required time, money, and exposure to the very situations in
which pilots need good decision-making skills to maintain safety of flight (Molesworth,
Wiggins, & O’Hare, 2006). As Jensen (1982) stated, without decision-making training,
“it is but a slight overstatement to say that good pilot judgment is learned by the lucky
and the cautious over many years of varied flying experience” (p. 61).
ADM: behavior management. Formal ADM training in all segments of aviation
began from the theoretical foundations of behavior management and management theory.
Early research on ADM emphasized changing pilot attitudes (Kochan, Jensen, Chubb, &
Hunter, 1997). Researchers thought of faulty ADM as a result of misplaced motivation or
a psychological factor in the pilot. GA ADM training materials therefore focused on
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making pilots aware of hazardous attitudes and management of stress and risks (Kochan
et al., 1997).
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the FAA published six manuals and an advisory
circular to provide official guidance on GA ADM training. These documents were based
on more than twelve years of research, development, and testing, and they represented the
first formal effort to provide guidance on formal ADM training (FAA, 1991). These
materials became the standard on which ADM training was based for a significant period
of time.
The focus on behavior management was consistent and evident throughout. For
example, the ADM manual for student and private pilots called Aeronautical Decision
Making for Student and Private Pilots stated that its purpose was to explain the risks
associated with flying, the behavioral causes of typical accidents, and the impact of stress
on decision making (Diehl, Hwochinsky, Lawton, & Livack, 1987).
The remaining FAA manuals were aimed at GA pilots at different levels of
training. Besides student and private pilots, the other manuals were designed for
instrument pilots, commercial pilots, instructor pilots, helicopter pilots, and pilots
working in multi-pilot crew environments (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Bush, Lawton, &
Livack, 1987; Jensen, 1989; Jensen & Adrion, 1988; Jensen, Adrion, & Lawton, 1987).
Each rating-specific manual explained the risks associated with that specific type of
flying activities. They then described the “underlying behavioral causes” of judgment
error and the effects of stress on decision making. They emphasized managing the pilot’s
behavior and stress as a way to avoid unnecessary risk (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Bush
et al., 1987; Diehl et al., 1987; Jensen, 1989; Jensen & Adrion, 1988; Jensen et al., 1987).
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Teaching exercises included helping the student assess their own hazardous attitudes and
identifying the hazardous attitudes exhibited by pilots who had accidents (Adams &
Thompson, 1987; Bush et al., 1987; Diehl et al., 1987; Jensen, 1989; Jensen & Adrion,
1988; Jensen et al., 1987). Finally, the manuals directed instructors to teach better
judgment by exposing students to flight situations drawn from actual accidents and
incidents, asking the students for input, and then giving feedback on the students’
responses (Jensen, 1989).
Aeronautical Decision Making began by stating that “good judgment can be
taught” (FAA, 1991, p. 1). The advisory circular’s stated purpose was to provide a
“systematic approach to risk assessment and stress management in aviation, illustrate
how personal attitudes can influence decision making and how those attitudes can be
modified to enhance safety” (FAA, 1991, p. i). The document described hazardous
attitudes and stress before outlining exercises to help students identify hazardous attitudes
in others and assess themselves.
The advisory circular provided a list of ADM definitions that have become
industry standard (FAA, 1991). The advisory circular also described the DECIDE model,
a six step, continuously looping process intended to give pilots a logical way to approach
decision making. The six steps of DECIDE were: detect, estimate, choose, identify, do,
and evaluate (FAA, 1991). The IMSAFE Checklist was offered as a method for assessing
the risks associated with a pilot’s personal state. IMSAFE stood for illness, medication,
stress, alcohol, fatigue, and eating (FAA, 1991).
The FAA also provided some specific aspects of ADM instruction. As with
previous guidance, this document advocated discussing scenarios with the student to
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ensure the student understood the hazardous attitudes (FAA, 1991). There was a new
emphasis on the flight instructor’s role in ADM training (a combination of role model,
evaluator, and coach). The FAA said students needed to be exposed to ADM instruction
earlier, and instructors needed to teach ADM in the air as well as on the ground. The
flight instructor needed to create in-flight scenarios to “stimulate the student’s decision
making process” and respond to student behavior in a way that encourages safe decision
making (FAA, 1991, p. 28).
The effectiveness of the FAA’s manuals was validated in multiple independent
studies where student pilots received training in accordance with the manuals along with
a standard flying curriculum (FAA, 1991). Pilots in empirical studies made significantly
fewer in-flight errors after receiving ADM training; the reduction in judgment errors
ranged from 10% to 50% (FAA, 1991). Pilots in an operational study at Petroleum
Helicopter Inc. demonstrated a 54% reduction in overall accident rate after receiving
recurrent training in accordance with the FAA’s ADM manuals (Diehl, 1992; FAA,
1991).
Although the effectiveness of the ADM training described in the FAA’s guidance
was validated by several studies, formal ADM training was not effectively integrated into
GA training. The FAA had provided guidance on ADM training but did not alter the
testing standards or certification methods to clearly define satisfactory ADM. Satisfactory
performance continued to be defined in terms of minimum knowledge, proficiency, and
aeronautical experience (Wright, 2002). With no clear standard for certification and no
motivation, GA training continued to “teach to the test” instead of using formal ADM
training.
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ADM: problem-solving skills and practice. Accident rates in GA plateaued
during the 1990s (Wright, 2002). The ultimate goal of ADM training was to improve GA
safety by reducing the occurrence of decision error accidents. Researchers interpreted the
lack of improvement in accident rates as an indication that current ADM training was
having little measurable impact on GA safety. This conclusion led to analyses of the
current ADM training materials and investigations into how to improve and better
implement ADM training methodologies. Research about ADM began to focus on ADM
as a problem-solving skill set, and began to emphasize practicing problem-solving in
ADM training instead of attitude management (Adams, 1992a; Adams, 1992b; Irving,
1992; Ericsson, 1992).
Many researchers presented their findings on existing ADM training at the FAA’s
ADM Workshop in 1992 (Adams & Adams, 1992). Adams (1992b) described the
judgment that expert pilots exhibited as composed of a “variety of different processing
skills and unique problem solving capabilities” (p. 110). He criticized the applicability of
the ADM training manuals developed by the FAA described above, saying that they
taught an algorithmic, linear process of methodical decision-making which did not
resemble the way experts actually made decisions when in emergency or stressful
conditions (Adams, 1992b).
Adams (1992b) suggested several alternative training methods. Activity-based
learning would engage flight students in real-world problems while in the training
environment, allowing students to gain experience in a controlled manner. Exercises and
discussions on SA based on vignettes would help students practice maintaining their SA
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(Adams, 1992b). Interactive computer or video training devices would be useful in
creating realistic activities (Adams, 1992b).
In another presentation, How Expert Pilots Think, Adams (1992a) revisited the
role of experience in developing problem-solving skills in contemporary ADM training.
He observed that practice was the most important variable in determining the level of
expertise an individual achieved in non-aviation domains (Adams, 1992a). Flying
experience was important in helping develop a pilot’s base of knowledge and procedural
responses in that the practice enabled faster pattern recognition, problem perception, and
more efficient problem solving (Adams, 1992a). Real-life flying rarely presented
opportunities to practice problem-solving, though, which suggested that pilots need ADM
training that provides more opportunity to practice those skills in order to gain expertise
(Adams, 1992a).
Irving (1992) also emphasized ADM as a complex problem-solving process. He
criticized the traditional ADM training method, which consisted primarily of on-the-job
training. Such training was restricted to the type of normal, day-to-day occurrences that
did not require advanced ADM skills. Random instead of structured, traditional ADM
training was not formalized in such a way as to ensure all the important skills were
covered (Irving, 1992).
Irving (1992) also criticized first-generation ADM training for relying too heavily
on formulaic procedures. Pilots were being trained to simply apply the procedure instead
of exploring alternative solutions (Irving, 1992). Performance was measured through
observation of easily measured motor skills and on how accurately the procedure was
applied, rather than valid measurements of ADM (Irving, 1992). Programs provided little
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or no guidance in acquiring data acquisition skills (Irving, 1992). Finally, training was
not being provided by expert decision-makers or based on input from subject matter
experts (Irving, 1992).
Irving (1992) suggested that ADM training programs incorporate structured
scenarios instead. Effective scenarios had to be realistic, ideally drawn from observations
of more experienced pilots (Irving, 1992). Scenarios would establish training objectives
beforehand and include a full debriefing afterwards (Irving, 1992). Using scenarios
would create opportunity for practicing the process of evaluating and solving dangerous
situations and review alternate solutions while safely in a hangar (Irving, 1992).
Ericsson’s (1992) presentation, Methodology for Studying and Training Expertise,
echoed the points made by Adams (1992a; 1992b) and Irving (1992). Ericsson (1992)
described expert decision making in aviation as a set of critical skills including
evaluation, correlation, and application of relevant memories. Deliberate practice was
necessary to acquire and maintain expert performance in aviation, just as in other
domains where expert performance was observed such as competitive sports and
medicine (Ericsson, 1992).
The researchers who gathered for the Workshop on Aeronautical Decision Making
formulated an action plan to improve ADM training effectiveness (Adams & Adams,
1992). The plan identified several key participants within the federal government,
industry, and academia (Adams & Adams, 1992). The plan identified four major tasks
that needed to be accomplished in order to improve overall effectiveness of ADM
training. Those tasks were to define the structure of decision making tasks, develop
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training requirements, specify training strategies, and evaluate training effectiveness
(Adams & Adams, 1992).
Problem-based learning. Several ADM training strategies were created and
tested after the Workshop on Aeronautical Decision Making (Adams & Adams, 1992).
The conceptualization of ADM as a set of problem-solving skills (rather than the result of
a behavior or motivation problem) led many aviation researchers to investigate adapting
problem-solving strategies that had been developed in other fields to aviation. One such
strategy was called problem-based learning (PBL).
Medical researchers at McMaster University School of Medicine pioneered the
PBL approach to teaching and curriculum design in 1966 (FAA, 2008). PBL was defined
as lessons structured to confront students with real-world problems and force them to
reach realistic solutions by practicing problem-solving skills (FAA, 2008). Variations of
PBL included SBT, collaborative problem-solving, and case study (FAA, 2008). SBT
used a highly structured script based on real-world experiences to “address aviation
training objectives in an operational environment” (FAA, 2008, p. 4-16). Collaborative
problem-solving engaged multiple students in collaborative problem-solving discussions
guided by an instructor (FAA, 2008). In case study training, the instructor presented an
account of a real world situation that illustrated a point and then prompted the students to
analyze the case, develop possible solutions, and come to conclusions (FAA, 2008).
Commercial and military training implementation. Forms of problem-solving
learning were adopted by the commercial and military aviation sectors after attending a
1979 workshop hosted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
Participants learned that the majority of human errors that led to accidents were failures
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of decision making, leadership, and communications (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm,
1999). Commercial airlines and military leadership left the workshop determined to
create training programs to prevent these errors. Such programs were strikingly popular
and evolved rapidly in an innovative and collaborative environment (Helmreich &
Foushee, 2010).
Commercial airlines created training programs to “enhance interpersonal aspects
of flight operations” (Helmreich et al., 1999, p. 1). These programs were known as crew
resource management (CRM) training programs (Diehl, 1992). United Airlines developed
the first comprehensive U.S. CRM program (Helmreich et al., 1999). KLM developed a
leadership training program, while Northwest pioneered Line Orientated Flight Training
(LOFT), a form of SBT which modeled each training session after a real-life, or “line”,
flight (Diehl, 1992). Most CRM programs evolved to include training manuals,
interactive classroom discussions, and LOFT sessions (Diehl, 1992).
CRM programs proved to be very effective at reducing pilot error in air carrier
operations. A case-series analysis of crashes and other mishaps of domestic air carrier
flights (operating under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 121), both
scheduled and nonscheduled, that occurred during 1983 – 2002 revealed several
encouraging trends (Baker, Qiang, Rebok, & Li, 2008). The proportion of mishaps
involving pilot error decreased from 42% in 1983-1987 to 25% in 1998-2002 (Baker et
al., 2008). Mishap rates related to poor decision making decreased from 6.2 to 1.8 per 10
million flights, and mishap rates involving poor crew interaction declined from 2.8 to 0.9
per 10 million flights (Baker et al., 2008). Baker et al. (2008) credited these
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improvements to air carriers’ emphasis on CRM as well as improving technology such as
cockpit displays.
The U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command (now Air Mobility Command) and
the U.S. Naval Safety Center pioneered Aircrew Coordination Training (ACT), the
military equivalent of CRM programs (Diehl, 1992). ACT programs were designed to
improve decision making as well as communications within military cockpits and
between crews and outside contacts (O’Conner, Hahn, & Nullmeyer, 2010). ACT
programs remained largely unchanged in the 1980s, but military-funded research in the
early 1990s led to advances in CRM training effectiveness (O’Conner et al., 2010). By
2010, the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard all utilized CRM
training programs (O’Conner et al., 2010). Many non-U.S. military services had
implemented a CRM program by 2010 too (O’Conner et al., 2010). Recent research
evaluated the effectiveness of SBT-based CRM training in the People’s Republic of
China Air Force (Li & Harris, 2005, 2008).
Li and Harris published a study in 2005 that evaluated the suitability of various
ADM mnemonics for resolving different types of decision-making scenarios. The
researchers asked instructor pilots (IPs) in the Chinese Air Force Academy to rate the
suitability of the following ADM methods: SHOR (Stimuli, Hypotheses, Options,
Response), PASS (Problem identiﬁcation, Acquire information, Survey strategy, Select
strategy), FOR-DEC (Facts, Options, Risks & Beneﬁts, Decision, Execution, Check),
SOAR (Situation, Options, Act, Repeat); and DESIDE (Detect, Estimate, Set safety
objectives, Identify, Do, Evaluate). The IPs favored two of the mnemonics depending on
how much time was available to make a decision; the IPs judged SHOR to be the best
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method for time-limited decisions while DESIDE was deemed more suitable for
decisions that were less time-limited and required more comprehensive thinking (Li and
Harris, 2005).
Li and Harris (2008) later created and tested an ADM training program that they
administered to a group of Chinese Tactical Training Wing pilots. Half of the participants
received Li and Harris’ ADM training course while the other half did not. All of the
participants then completed simulated flights in a full-flight simulator where the
participants’ decision-making skills were evaluated with respect to situation assessment,
risk management, and response time. Those pilots who received the ADM training
exhibited significant improvements in the quality of their situation assessment and risk
management, although response time was negatively impacted. Li and Harris (2008)
concluded that their ADM training program was effective in improving decision making
and that ADM was trainable.
GA training research. Several forms of PBL were tested in GA settings as well.
O’Hare, Mullen, and Arnold completed a study in 2009 testing the effectiveness of casebased reflection. O’Hare et al. (2009) gathered a sample of non-pilots, and provided
different ADM training to groups of test subjects. All of the subjects read case studies
where a pilot encountered adverse weather. Half of the subjects read cases where the pilot
successfully dealt with the conditions and landed safely while the other half read cases
where the pilot crashed. After reading the case studies, half of the subjects participated in
a reflective thinking exercise while the other half merely recalled as much detail as
possible about the cases. They then flew a simulated flight on a computer-based flight
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simulator and had to decide when (or if) to discontinue a flight as the researchers
gradually made the weather conditions deteriorate (O’Hare, et al., 2009).
Those participants who reflected on the cases stopped the flight sooner, when the
weather had not deteriorated as far, than those who merely recalled the cases (O’Hare, et
al., 2009). Several participants who merely recalled the cases failed to discontinue the
flight and crashed into terrain. The outcome of the cases did not have a significant impact
on the participants’ decision making. These results led the researchers to conclude that
reflecting on cases improved ADM with respect to recognition of critical weather
situations and adherence to relevant regulations. Whether the cases studied resulted in
success or a crash did not seem to have any significance. Although the researchers
intentionally selected participants who were not pilots, the apparent improvement in
decision-making as a result of reflection demonstrated the utility of case-based training
for ADM (O’Hare et al., 2009).
Lee, Fanjoy, and Dillman (2005) examined the effects of regular exposure to
safety information on the ADM capacity of students in a collegiate flight program. The
study focused on ADM involved in mechanical malfunction scenarios. The researchers
took three measurements of the participants’ ADM: recognition time, response time, and
appropriateness of response (Lee et al., 2005). The population consisted of undergraduate
students who had received their private pilot certificate and were training for a
commercial pilot certificate. The experimental group of students received online access to
a safety information system that compiled aircraft discrepancies; the experimental group
also received online prompts to review the information in the safety information system
before each of their routine training flights over a five-week period. The results showed a
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measurable improvement in recognition time, response time, and appropriateness of
response in experimental participants compared to the control participants (Lee et al.,
2005). The study findings therefore supported the hypothesis that regular exposure to
safety information improves ADM (Lee et al., 2005).
ADM mnemonics and acronyms. Operators used many mnemonics and
acronyms to help pilots remember CRM, ADM, and Single Pilot Resource Management
(SRM) concepts. Some examples included FATE, which summarized the basic steps in
the ADM process: Fly the aircraft; Assess the situation; Take appropriate action; Evaluate
the results (Sumwalt & Watson, 1995). The FAA developed other mnemonics for ADM
including the Three-P (3P) model. According to the 3P model, the pilot applied ADM by
perceiving the current flight circumstances, processing the significance of those
circumstances, and performing the best course of action [emphasis added] (FAA, 2008a).
Other ADM mnemonics included SHOR, PASS, FOR-DEC, SOAR, and DESIDE
(Li & Harris, 2005). The FAA promoted the IMSAFE and PAVE checklists to help pilots
manage risk (FAA, 2008a). IMSAFE evaluated personal risk factors, as described
previously; PAVE divided flight risks into four categories of “Pilot in command, Aircraft,
enVironment, and External pressures” (FAA, 2008a, p. 9-6). The Five Ps (5 Ps) was
another commonly used memory aid for evaluating the risk of a flight. The 5 Ps consisted
of “the Plan, the Plane, the Pilot, the Passengers, and the Programming” (FAA, 2008a, p.
9-13).
Implementing GA ADM Training
Formal ADM training still had not been widely implemented in GA as recently as
2009 although PBL-based ADM training programs were implemented decades earlier by
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commercial and military operators (Wright, 2009). Implementation of CRM, LOFT, and
Advanced Qualification Program (AQP) at commercial carriers resulted in significant
improvements in decision-related accident rates and in overall pilot error rates (Baker et
al., 2008; Wright, 2009). In contrast, accident statistics show that pilot-error accident
rates for GA improved very little during the 1990s and remained unchanged during the
past decade (AOPA, 2009; AOPA, 2010).
The lack of measurable improvement in decision error rates and in overall
accident rates in GA prompted escalating responses from the FAA, industry, and
academia from the late 1990s on. The FAA formed CGAR and founded the FITS
program. These programs involved increasingly collaborative efforts between the FAA
and industry representatives such as manufacturers and operators, and educational
institutions to develop consensus-based standards. The FAA also published revised
guidance on ADM training – emphasizing the use of SBT – in new versions of several
manuals and practical test standards (PTS) between 2008 and 2011 (FAA, 2008a; FAA,
2008b; FAA, 2010a; FAA, 2010b; FAA, 2011a; FAA, 2011b).
FAA CGAR. The FAA founded CGAR in 2001 (CGAR, 2011). Aviation
universities including ERAU, University of Alaska, University of North Dakota (UND),
and Wichita State University coordinated through CGAR to support industry and FAA
research goals. CGAR’s mission is to “make significant contributions toward
improvements in safety and efficiency for GA air transportation […] with
multidisciplinary teams to enhance aviation related research, education, technology
transfer and the utilization of research in mission critical areas” (CGAR, 2011, p. 1).
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FITS. The FAA launched the FITS program under the Safer Skies program in
2002 (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003). There was
growing support to “train the way you will fly (in the real world) and fly the way you
were trained” in GA (Wright, 2002, p. 10). The overall goals of the FITS program were
to identify changing training needs and develop standards based on industry consensus
that responded to the pace of development in GA (“FAA-Industry Training Standards
[FITS] Program Plan,” 2003). FITS aimed to create scenario-based, learner-focused
training materials that would produce pilots with more practical knowledge and skills
than traditional training provided (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program
Plan,” 2003). Supporting goals included developing a new GSC infrastructure to support
reforms in GA training (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003).
Initial members of FITS included the FAA, CGAR, and industry leaders such as
Eclipse Aviation, Adam Aircraft, Cessna Aircraft, and Elite Air Center (“FAA-Industry
Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003). An oversight committee composed of
FAA and industry members oversaw the FITS program plan, goals, methodology,
schedule, and tasking (“FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003).
The FAA also created a FITS Work Group which evaluated the products FITS delivered,
and developed recommended training programs and guidance (“FAA-Industry Training
Standards [FITS] Program Plan,” 2003).
The FAA-Industry Training Standards [FITS] Program Plan (2003) explained
reasons to reform the existing GSC in GA. Existing GSC was comprised of advisory
circulars, handbooks, PTS, and other materials such as the ADM manuals described
above (Adams & Thompson, 1987; Bush et al., 1987; Diehl et al., 1987; Jensen, 1989;
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Jensen & Adrion, 1988; Jensen et al., 1987). FITS researchers doubted whether many GA
training operators used the existing GSC at all (“FAA-industry,” 2003). Many documents
were so out-of-date as to be obsolete (“FAA-industry,” 2003). Revising these documents
was a lengthy process and the FAA had no method for managing the GSC’s currency
(“FAA-industry,” 2003). The accelerating pace at which technology was modernizing
GA aircraft, navigation, and airspace only aggravated GSC’s inflexibility. Other GSC
material was incomplete. The GSC material that was current was oriented towards
teaching to the knowledge and practical tests rather than developing ADM, SA and other
HOTS through an SBT and performance-based testing approach (“FAA-industry,” 2003).
As it was, the GSC prevented a reform of the GA training paradigm because it
maintained the current maneuver-based training (MBT) paradigm (Wright, 2002).
The overall goals of the FITS program were to identify changing training needs
and develop industry standards that responded to the pace of development in GA and
were based on industry consensus (“FAA-industry,” 2003). Supporting goals included
developing a new GSC infrastructure to support reforms in GA training (“FAA-industry,”
2003). FITS was not intended as a regulatory mechanism, rather, the goal has been to
create safer pilots in less time by creating voluntary alternatives to regulatory-mandated
training (Glista, 2003). Possible applications included an FAA-approved proficiency
program and aircraft or equipment specific training that would lower insurance premiums
(Glista, 2003).
Researchers at FITS universities conducted studies to investigate the effectiveness
of FITS training. A study conducted at ERAU in the fall of 2004 compared collegiate
students training towards an instrument rating in traditional MBT to students who were
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instructed using SBT (French, Blickensderfer, Ayers, & Connolly, 2005). The population
sample was 27 ERAU students training for the instrument rating. The researchers
randomly assigned the participants to the control (MBT) or experimental (SBT) groups.
All participants received eight hours of training before the final evaluation. An
experimentally blind rater evaluated the participants’ instrument flight skills using a
computer-based flight simulator program on pre- and post-training “data collection
flight[s]” (French et al., 2005). Both MBT and SBT trained students showed significant
improvements between the pre- and post-test measures. Furthermore, the SBT group
performed statistically better on many measures of piloting ability than the MBT group in
the post-test measures. The results suggested that SBT may improve instrument flight
rules (IFR) piloting and navigation skills over traditional MBT in a TAA aircraft (French
et al., 2005).
UND conducted a study that compared the effectiveness of SBT in teaching
HOTS and decision making to traditional aviation instruction and self-study (Robertson,
Petros, Schumacher, McHorse, & Ulrich, 2006). The study used 45 undergraduate UND
students, divided into three groups (Robertson et al., 2006). All participants were upperlevel undergraduate students who were qualified to fly at least one other single-engine
piston aircraft (Robertson et al., 2006). The SBT-trained group was trained using
transition training that UND researchers had previously designed for Cirrus Aircraft to
transition pilots into the Cirrus SR22; PBL was incorporated into both ground and flight
instruction (Robertson et al., 2006). The self-study group used the Cirrus SR 22 Pilot’s
Operating Handbook (POH) and CD-ROM-based training materials; their instruction
consisted of being presented with scenarios and asked to research the POH to find a
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solution for the scenarios (Robertson et al., 2006). The alternate treatment group was
used as a control and received non-PBL instruction and MBT similar to traditional
transition training (Robertson et al., 2006).
Pre- and post-training sessions conducted in a simulator provided the data to
evaluate the participants’ aircraft control, pilot performance, SA, and ADM (Robertson et
al., 2006). Eight research assistants either possessed a CFI certificate or received training
to conduct the evaluations. The research assistants also provided the ground and flight
training, then evaluated the students that the other assistants had trained (Robertson et al.,
2006). The results indicated significant improvements in measurements of judgment and
ADM, SA, and automation management ability (Robertson et al., 2006). None of the
differences were statistically significant, though, so the study had difficulty supporting a
shift in GA training from MBT to SBT (Robertson et al., 2006). The study did not
identify any weaknesses of FITS training as implemented in the study (Robertson et al.,
2006).
The FITS program’s emphasis on higher-order skills such as enhanced decision
making and single-pilot resource management represented a significant departure from
the established MBT philosophy. As Wright (2011) discussed, the intention behind FITS
was to reform the old training paradigm to better train GA pilots to deal with current
safety issues. FITS research, such as the studies discussed above, validated the
effectiveness of SBT in GA training and the effectiveness of collaboration between the
FAA and industry. Other FITS studies verified that FITS SBT training was high quality
and participants were very satisfied (Robertson & Summers, 2007). Despite the FITS
program’s validation of SBT, progress on reforming the GA training paradigm to
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conform with SBT instead of traditional MBT moved slowly (Wright, 2011). Wright
(2009) asserted that reform needed in GA would not happen without industry leadership.
Reforms to GSC have moved slowly too. More explicit standards for ADM were
included in the last revisions of several PTS; the Instrument Rating PTS and Certified
Flight Instructor, Instrument Rating PTS were revised in 2010 (FAA, 2010a; FAA,
2010b). The Private PTS and Commercial PTS were revised to include similar, explicit
standards for ADM and an emphasis on using SBT to evaluate applicants, effective June
2012 (FAA, 2011a; FAA, 2011b). The FAA also included extensive material on SBT,
SA, and SRM in the latest version of the Aviation Instructor’s Handbook (FAA, 2008a)
and discussed ADM in the latest version of the Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical
Knowledge (FAA, 2008b).
Continuing the GA Training Reform Initiative
GA safety and training were still a significant issue in 2012. The NTSB added GA
Safety to its Most Wanted List in 2011 (NTSB, 2011c). The NTSB also hosted a forum,
General Aviation Safety: Climbing to the Next Level, in June 2012 to raise awareness of
GA safety issues, promote discussions, and determine effective actions to be taken
(NTSB, 2012). Industry organizations such as AOPA, GAMA, and SAFE plus many
individual researchers have expressed concerns over the sustainability of GA if accident
rates are not improved (GAMA, 2010; SAFE, 2011b; Wright, 2009).
Continuing the GA training reform required active leadership from industry
groups to promote the implementation of new training methods (Wright, 2011). SAFE is
an industry group that has played an important role in coordinating the GA training
reform since it formed in 2009. SAFE is an organization of aviation educators “fostering
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professionalism and excellence in aviation through continuing education, professional
standards, and accreditation” (“About SAFE,” 2012). SAFE’s Mission Statement states
that they seek to “create a safer environment through enhanced education” (“Vision &
Mission Statement,” 2012).
SAFE held a Pilot Training Reform Symposium in May 2011 where members met
to form a “consistent framework for reform” (SAFE, 2011a). Attendees included senior
FAA personnel, decorated flight instructors, and many prominent industry representatives
(Stowell, 2011). SAFE published a preliminary report soon after the symposium,
detailing the projects that SAFE members recommended. Members supplied many
suggestions at the Symposium to promote GA training reform. These suggestions were
consolidated into the following six “actionable and specific projects”:
1. Conduct a thorough general aviation fatal accident root cause analysis to
pinpoint underlying accident causality as a means to create effective remedial
actions.
2. Create a new flight review option that can be enabled as an FAA-sponsored
pilot proficiency award program.
3. Revise FAA doctrine and standards to implement scenario-based testing, risk
management, and other higher order pilot skills.
4. Modify flight instructor doctrine, initial testing, and renewal procedures to
include the teaching of higher order pilot skills.
5. Implement voluntary flight instructor professional accreditation programs and
continuing education that emphasize higher order pilot skills, scenario training,
and interpersonal relationship skills.
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6. Create and implement model curricula that incorporate higher order pilot skills,
scenario-based training, and integration of simulation and other teaching
methods to include interpersonal relationship skills. (SAFE, 2011a, p. 4, 10)

The report designated a project lead, participating organizations, required actions,
expected outcomes, and a proposed timeline for each of the projects (SAFE, 2011a).
An update report, released in October of 2011, described the progress achieved
since the Symposium (SAFE, 2011b). Limited progress had been made. For example, the
FAA convened a Flight Training Standards Aviation Rulemaking Committee in late 2011
to specifically address needed reforms in standards for airmen knowledge tests and PTS
(SAFE, 2011b). Several courseware providers posted free online training syllabi within
weeks of the symposium (SAFE, 2011b). The FAA also revitalized and reorganized the
General Aviation Joint Steering Committee (GAJSC), a committee composed of industry
and FAA representatives that has existed but not provided much leadership for the past
decade (SAFE, 2011b).
The update report also voiced concerns. Training reforms remained vital to
improve aviation safety and to promote growth (SAFE, 2011b). SAFE called for
leadership, particularly from the FAA and the GAJSC, and from the bottom up through
grassroots organizations (SAFE, 2011b). The report called on the FAA and industry to
reach a consensus on the path to training reform (SAFE, 2011b).
Summary
The GA community incorporates a large and varied population, but has had a poor
safety record compared to other aviation sectors. The number of active pilots, certificates
issued, and hours flown all decreased in the last ten years, continuing the trend of the

46
preceding decades. Relevant subsets of the GA pilot population include novice pilots,
accident-prone pilots, and ERAU student pilots.
The concepts of judgment, ADM, HOTS, and SA were researched. Government,
academia, and industry formed the first formal ADM training efforts, employing behavior
management strategies to improve ADM. ADM training later evolved to emphasize
problem-solving skills and practice. Researchers created and tested different forms of
PBL, including SBT, collaborative problem-solving, and case study. Researchers also
tested the effectiveness of various memory aids and mnemonics.
ADM training became a cornerstone of the growing movement to reform GA
training. The traditional MBT paradigm was no longer sufficient to improve ADM and
HOTS in GA; training needed to shift to an SBT paradigm in order to effectively teach
ADM and HOTS and improve GA’s safety record. Significant efforts to reform GA
training into an SBT paradigm included CGAR, the FITS program, and SAFE.
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Chapter III
Methodology
Research Approach
This comparative study used the following experimental design. The population
sample was divided into two groups – control and experimental – each with 15
participants. The control group completed two SBT sessions in a Frasca Mentor
Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD) (Frasca International, Inc., 2010). The
initial AATD session was used to establish the participants’ baseline ADM while the
second AATD session revealed any change in the participants’ ADM. Like the control
group, the experimental group completed two SBT sessions in an AATD to establish a
baseline and then document any change in the participants’ ADM. The experimental
group also received an ADM training treatment between the first and second SBT
sessions. The researcher observed all of the AATD sessions, conducted the ADM training
treatment, and scored the participants’ ADM, based on real-time observations and
subsequent review of the sessions via video and audio recordings.
Design and procedures.
Designating the control and experimental groups. The study participants were
divided into two groups. The participants’ names were entered into a computer program
which randomly assigned a number to each participant. The participants were then
organized according to his or her assigned number. Those participants with the lower 15
numbers were designated the control group; those with the higher 15 numbers were
designated the experimental group.
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AATD session design. The study used four ADM scenarios to test the
participants’ ADM in the AATD sessions. The four scenarios included a variety of
different decisions that pilots realistically encounter on a visual flight rules (VFR) crosscountry flight. The variety of scenarios allowed enough possible combinations of first
and second scenarios to avoid rehearsal effects. The scenarios were randomly chosen for
each participant’s first AATD session. The scenario for that participant’s second AATD
session was randomly selected from the remaining three scenarios.
The researcher developed the four scenarios using personal experiences and
stories from fellow flight instructors to generate points where the participant would need
to make a decision. Personal knowledge of a typical ERAU flight student’s training also
informed several design choices for the scenarios (simulation equipment used, planned
route of flight, etc.). The dilemmas presented in each scenario were generic and designed
to imitate a common human-error related accident cause.
Each scenario simulated a VFR cross-country flight in a Cessna 172S NAV III
Skyhawk (C172 Nav III) equipped with the Garmin G1000 avionics suite. The C172 Nav
III is a single-engine propeller-driven aircraft with a 36-foot wingspan that can carry four
people including the pilot. The C172 Nav III is the aircraft ERAU uses for all primary
flight training. The Frasca Mentor AATD, installed at ERAU’s Daytona Beach campus,
is modeled after the C172 Nav III. Using that Frasca Mentor allowed the researcher to put
the participants, who were all ERAU flight students, into a familiar aircraft, eliminating
any effect on performance caused by an unfamiliar aircraft.
The route of flight departed from Southwest Florida International Airport
(KRSW) near Naples, Florida and followed visual landmarks and Victor airways to
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Hurlburt Field (KHRT) near Pensacola, FL. This route was chosen because it was far
enough away from Daytona Beach to put students in unfamiliar territory but was still
within the AATD’s geographical database.
Each scenario began with the participant cruising in straight and level flight
somewhere enroute. The starting location changed for each scenario. Otherwise, starting
conditions were similar for all four scenarios. Appendix F shows the AATD Session
Procedure for one of the scenarios which includes the initial conditions. While the
scenario was in progress, a researcher assistant role-played as air traffic control and any
other voices the participant would hear over the radio or in the cockpit.
AATD session procedure. Each participant completed two AATD sessions,
spaced several days apart. The procedure for the first and second AATD sessions was
identical. Prior to entering the AATD, the researcher briefed each participant on the
schedule for the session. The participant was provided with a Consent Form (see
Appendix B) and a Pilot Briefing (see Appendix C). The participant was then provided
with cross-country planning materials including a weight and balance form, a standard
weather briefing, a completed flight plan, a completed navigation log, and VFR sectional
charts and IFR low-altitude enroute charts covering the entire route. The participants
were allowed as much time as they desired to review and organize the cross-country
materials.
When the participant was ready, the researcher guided them to the AATD and
provided a notepad, pen, and an Airport Facility Directory (AFD). The researcher briefed
the participant that he or she would start the simulation when ready by pushing a red
button on the AATD’s instrument panel. Participants were instructed to fly the AATD as
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if they were flying a real Cessna 172 on a real VFR cross-country flight. The researcher
stated that she would tell the participant to end the scenario by pushing the red button
when it was time.
The researcher conducted a debrief at the end of each session, before the
participant exited the AATD. The Debrief Form (see Appendix E) included several
questions designed to assess the participant’s SA and the degree to which he or she used
an ADM process. The debrief was not treated as data but assisted the researcher in
scoring the participant’s ADM.
Treatment design. The researcher designed the treatment, drawing guidance from
the FAA’s Advisory Circular concerning ADM, Aeronautical Decision Making (FAA,
1991), and from FITS materials including the FAA-Industry Training Standards (FITS)
Program Plan (2003), FITS Master Instructor Syllabus (2006), and SRM Scenario
(2009). The intent was to provide SBT to pilots in a classroom setting, thus accelerating
the acquisition of higher-level decision-making skills. The treatment was divided into two
phases: (a) inform the participants on ADM principles, strategies, and practical
applications, and (b) guide the participants as they apply that information to a crosscountry flight scenario.
The treatment was conducted in a conference-style classroom on ERAU’s
Daytona Beach campus. The room was equipped with a single, long table where
everyone sat. This arrangement allowed the participants to see and interact with each
other, encouraging everyone’s involvement in the discussion.
Treatment procedure. The treatment was delivered to the experimental group in
groups of two to six participants between the participants’ first and second AATD
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sessions. Each treatment session began with providing a Consent Form to each
participant (see Appendix B). The researcher then delivered a short presentation on ADM
principles, strategies, and practical applications using a PowerPoint® presentation as a
visual aid. The expected outcomes of the treatment were that participants:


Accepted the importance of sound ADM



Understood that ADM must be active; the pilot in command (PIC) must
actively seek out decisions and then resolve them



Understood and used the 5Ps (Plan, Plane, Pilot, Passengers, Programming),
IMSAFE (Illness, Medication, Stress, Alcohol, Fatigue, Eating), DECIDE
(Detect, Estimate, Choose, Identify, Do, Evaluate), and FATE (Fly the
airplane, Assess the situation, Take action, Evaluate) models to analyze a
scenario.

Next, the researcher guided the participants through a group discussion
concerning a hypothetical cross-country flight. A PowerPoint presentation sourced from
the FITS website (“SRM Scenario,” 2009) displayed relevant information about the flight
while the researcher prompted the participants to apply the ADM information they had
just received. Prompts included:


What is the status of the 5Ps now?



What are your concerns?



Do you have any decisions to make? Explain.



What actions could you take?



What resources could you use to help make this decision?



What action would you take? Why?
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What concerns do you have after you decided to …?

The researcher ended the group session by recapping key points of the presentation,
answering any lingering questions, and soliciting feedback on how useful the participants
thought the session would be if it were integrated into ERAU’s regular flight training
curriculum.
Apparatus and materials. The AATD sessions were completed in a Frasca
Mentor AATD (Frasca International, Inc., 2010) installed at ERAU’s Daytona Beach
campus (see Figure 1). This AATD’s instrument panel included the G1000 integrated
avionics suite, a popular example of an all-glass panel available in many GA TAAs. The
G1000’s two liquid crystal displays (LCDs) replace the traditional six-pack flight
instruments and separate navigation and avionics components into a larger, integrated
format. With a functional understanding of how to operate it, the G1000 can dramatically
improve a pilot’s SA by making flight information easier to scan and process (“Garmin
G1000®,” 2012). However, the G1000 can just as easily overwhelm a pilot who is
unfamiliar with the system. Two video cameras installed on either side of the AATD and
a portable audio recorder were used to record the sessions.
The treatment was conducted in a conference-style classroom on ERAU’s
Daytona Beach campus. The room was equipped with a single, long table. The researcher
used a computer, a projector, and a hanging screen to display two PowerPoint
presentations. The researcher used a whiteboard and markers to provide additional
training material.

53

Figure 1, Frasca Mentor Advanced Aviation Training Device (AATD).

Population Sample
The population was collegiate flight students. Participants for this study were
solicited by the researcher from the population of flight students at ERAU’s Daytona
Beach campus. The researcher visited all fall 2011 sections of AS 321 Commercial Pilot
Operations (ERAU’s commercial pilot ground lab) and one of the weekly meetings of
Alpha Omicron Alpha, an aviation honor society. These two population subsets included
approximately 170 students.
The researcher gave a short presentation describing the study and its benefits, and
then asked those interested to provide their contact information. Seventy students
volunteered contact information. Many students stopped responding to emails, but 32
remained in contact. The study thus began with a population sample of 32 active
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participants. Two of those participants did not complete the last phase of the study,
leaving the study with a final self-selected sample of 30 participants.
Data Collection Device
This study used one primary data collection device. The researcher used the
Scoring Sheet (see Appendix D) to record observations of the participants and assign
scores as they completed each AATD session. Scores were entered for each of the
variables at each decision point in the session. Each ordinal variable was scored as a 1, 2,
or 3. A score of 2 described a relatively wide range of behaviors and meant that the
researcher judged the participant’s ADM to be adequate for the situation but not
exceptional. A score of 1 meant that the researcher judged the participant’s ADM to be
inadequate for the situation. A score of 3 meant that the researcher judged the
participant’s ADM to be exceptionally good, not merely good enough. Later, the scores
for each ordinal variable (Problem Comprehended, Projection, Decision Process Used,
and Timely Manner) were averaged across all decision points to yield a session score for
each variable. The session scores were then averaged to generate an Overall ADM score
for that participant.
For example, consider the scores received by Participant 1 in Appendix D,
Sample Scoring Sheet. This sample shows scores that four generic participants could
have received in the first AATD session. Participant 1 completed a session that involved
three decision points. In Comprehension, Participant 1 received a score of 2 for the first
decision point, a 1 for the second decision point, and a 2 for the third decision point. The
researcher calculated that participant’s session score for Comprehension by averaging
those three scores (2, 1, and 2) which results in a score of 1.67. The researcher averaged
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the remaining ordinal scores to calculate a session score for Projection (1.67), Decision
Process Used (1.67), and Timely Manner (2.00). The researcher then averaged the session
scores (1.67, 1.67, 1.67, and 2.00) to calculate an Overall ADM score of 1.75. Nominal
data (Problem Detected, Problem Resolved, and Safe Outcome) was aggregated and
analyzed by group – control versus experimental.
The researcher also used a Debrief Form (see Appendix E) to facilitate a guided
debrief with the participant at the end of each AATD session. The debrief served two
purposes: (a) the debrief was intended to maximize participants’ learning by guiding
them through a review of the experiences and the decisions they just made, and (b) the
debrief solicited the participants’ thoughts and impressions which provided valuable
insight for the researcher and enabled more accurate scoring.
Content validity and reliability. Content validity is an estimate of how well an
instrument reflects the intended construct or domain of content (Howell et al., 2005). In
this study, the researcher sought to assess ADM and designed a study to test for ADM
skills. The process for determining content validity involved using experiential content
validity experts (CFIs) and professional experts (aviation practitioners who were
university professors). The content validity of the study was supported by the theorybased constructs from the literature review on ADM. The result was a study design that
had content validity with greater relevance for the target population of pilots ranging
from student pilots to apprentice flight instructors.
Content reliability refers to whether an instrument will produce consistent results
each time it is administered in the same setting to the same subject (George & Mallery,
2011). The researcher determined content reliability by performing a series of
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Chronbach’s alpha analyses, which measure an instrument’s internal consistency. The
Chronbach’s alpha was measured for four subsets of data. The first measurement
considered the ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round One, excluding their
Overall ADM scores. The second analysis measured the consistency of the ordinal
variable scores for all participants in Round Two, excluding their Overall ADM scores.
The third analysis measured the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all
participants in Round One, including the Overall ADM scores; the last analysis measured
the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round Two.
Treatment of the Data
Descriptive statistics. The data collection device for this study, the Scoring
Sheet, recorded the following variables: Problem Detected, Problem Comprehended,
Projection, Decision Process Used, Problem Resolved, Timely Manner, and Safe
Outcome (see Appendix D). Three variables (Problem Detected, Problem Resolved, and
Safe Outcome) were nominal and were described in charts. Four variables (Problem
Comprehended, Projection, Decision Process Used, and Timely Manner) were ordinal
data and were described in tables depicting the mean, the standard deviation (SD), the
minimum, the maximum, and the count (N).
Reliability Testing. The researcher determined content reliability by performing
a series of Chronbach’s alpha analyses. Chronbach’s alpha measures were performed
including all of the ordinal values except for the Overall ADM scores. Then, Chronbach’s
alpha measures were performed again for all of the ordinal values including the Overall
ADM scores.

57
Hypothesis testing. Hypothesis testing was conducted in five stages. First, the
participants’ baseline ADM performance was established by using Mann-Whitney tests to
compare the scores for the control and the experimental groups in the first AATD
session. Second, the participants’ ending ADM was tested by using Mann-Whitney tests
to compare the scores for the control and the experimental groups in the second AATD
session. Third, the change in the control group’s ADM was tested by using Wilcoxon
tests to compare the control group’s scores from the first AATD sessions to their scores
in the second AATD sessions. Fourth, the change in the experimental group’s ADM was
tested by using Wilcoxon tests to compare the experimental group’s scores from the first
AATD sessions to their scores from the second AATD sessions. Fifth, Mann-Whitney
tests were used to compare the Delta, or change, in ADM for the control group to the
Delta in ADM for the experimental group.
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Chapter IV
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The sample included 30 flight students enrolled in a baccalaureate program at
ERAU. The sample included 23 male students and 7 female students. The control group
was composed of 12 male students and 3 female students; the experimental group was
composed of 11 male students and 4 female students.
All participants had relatively low total flight time. Total time was recorded from
each participant’s logbook at the beginning of his or her first AATD session. The
minimum total time was 55 hours and the maximum total time was 510 hours. Twentythree of the participants (out of 30 total) had fewer than 200 hours. Figure 2 shows the
range of total time of all the participants, and Figure 3 shows the range of total time of
the participants for the control and the experimental groups (grouped in 50-hour
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Figure 2. Total time of all participants.
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Figure 3. Total time of the participants, control and experimental groups.

The participants held a varying range of pilot certificates and ratings. Figure 4
shows a count of participants by the most advanced rating held. Figure 5 shows a count
of participants by the most advanced rating held for the control and the experimental
groups. The mode of the sample was the private pilot certificate. The population also
included nine commercial pilots and four student pilots. Four of the commercial pilots
were also CFIs. One participant who held a glider rating was categorized according to
that participant’s highest airplane certificate, private pilot certificate with multi-engine
rating.
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Figure 4. Highest certification held by the participants.
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Figure 5. Highest certification held by the participants, control and experimental groups.

Dependent variables. Each of the participants was scored at multiple decisions
points within each AATD session using seven variables. The data were either nominal or
ordinal as follows:
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Nominal Variables
o Problem Detected (Yes/No)
o Problem Resolved (Yes/No)
o Safe Outcome (Yes/No)



Ordinal Variables
o Problem Comprehended (1, 2, or 3)
o Problem Projected (1, 2, or 3)
o Decision Process Used (1, 2, or 3)
o Timely manner (1, 2, or 3)

The researcher then averaged the session scores to generate an overall ADM score
for that participant in that AATD session. Finally, the researcher calculated the Delta
(change) in each participant’s ADM between Round One and Round Two. These
calculations yielded the following ordinal variables:


Ordinal Variables, Calculated
o Overall ADM (0 - 3)
o Delta Problem Comprehended (0 - 3)
o Delta Problem Projected (0 - 3)
o Delta Decision Process Used (0 - 3)
o Delta Timely manner (0 - 3)
o Delta Overall ADM (0 - 3)

The researcher counted the nominal data and aggregated them for the two groups,
control or experimental. Figures 6 through 8 show the percentage of decisions for which
the participants received a Yes score instead of a No. For Problem Detected (Figure 6), a
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Yes means the participant detected the problem. For Problem Resolved (Figure 7), a Yes
means the participant successfully resolved the problem. For Safe Outcome (Figure 8), a
Yes means that the participant overcame the problem to reach a safe outcome.
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Figure 6. Participants detected the problem, percentage of decisions.
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Figure 7. Participants resolved the problem, percentage of decisions.
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Figure 8. Participants reached a safe outcome.

Table 1 shows the five ordinal variables (Problem Comprehended, Problem
Projected, Decision Process Used, Timely Manner, and Overall ADM) for the control and
experimental groups in the first AATD sessions. Very few participants received 3s.
Slightly more received 1s, and the majority received 2s.
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Table 1
Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups, First AATD Sessions

Control

Comp

Proj

Proc

Time

Overall

15

15

15

15

15

Mean

1.78

1.76

1.64

1.60

1.69

Range

1.33

1.67

1.33

1.50

1.33

Minimum

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Maximum

2.33

2.67

2.33

2.50

2.33

Std. Deviation

.32

.42

.44

.54

.40

15

15

15

15

15

Mean

1.88

1.82

1.74

1.82

1.82

Range

1.67

2.00

2.00

2.00

1.92

Minimum

1.33

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.08

Maximum

3.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

Std. Deviation

.47

.65

.71

.74

.63

N

Experimental N

Note. Comp = Problem Comprehended, Proj = Problem Projected, Proc = Decision
Process Used, Time = Timely Manner, Overall = Overall ADM.
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Table 2 shows the five ordinal variables for the control and experimental groups
in the second AATD sessions.

Table 2
Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups, Second AATD Sessions

Control

Comp

Proj

Proc

Time

Overall

15

15

15

15

15

Mean

2.02

1.96

1.83

1.82

1.91

Range

2.00

2.00

2.00

2.00

2.00

Minimum

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Maximum

3.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

3.00

Std. Deviation

.58

.68

.69

.74

.65

15

15

15

15

15

Mean

2.02

1.93

1.89

1.96

1.95

Range

.67

1.67

1.33

1.67

1.17

Minimum

1.67

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.25

Maximum

2.33

2.67

2.33

2.67

2.42

Std. Deviation

.20

.42

.37

.45

.33

N

Experimental N

Note. Comp = Problem Comprehended, Proj = Problem Projected, Proc = Decision
Process Used, Time = Timely Manner, Overall = Overall ADM.

Table 3 shows the Delta, or change, in the five ordinal variables between the first
and second AATD sessions for the control and experimental groups. The Delta was
calculated by subtracting each participant’s Round One scores from their respective
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Round Two scores. A positive Delta indicated an improvement in ADM; a negative Delta
indicated a regression.

Table 3
Delta of Ordinal Variables for the Control and Experimental Groups

Control

Delta
Comp

Delta
Proj

Delta
Proc

Delta
Time

Delta
Overall

N

15

15

15

15

15

Mean

.24

.20

.19

.22

.21

Range

1.33

1.33

1.50

2.00

1.21

Minimum

-.33

-.33

-.50

-.67

-.38

Maximum

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.33

.83

Std. Deviation

.42

.43

.50

.63

.44

15

15

15

15

15

Mean

.14

.11

.14

.13

.13

Range

1.67

2.00

2.33

2.67

2.00

Minimum

-1.00

-1.33

-1.33

-1.33

-1.25

Maximum

.67

.67

1.00

1.33

.75

Std. Deviation

.40

.56

.72

.69

.56

Experimental N

Note. Comp = Problem Comprehended, Proj = Problem Projected, Proc = Decision
Process Used, Time = Timely Manner, Overall = Overall ADM.

Reliability Testing
A series of Chronbach’s alpha analyses was conducted to measure the reliability
of the data. The first analysis measured the consistency of the ordinal variable scores for
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all participants in Round One, excluding their Overall ADM scores. The Chronbach’s
alpha on standardized items for those four variables was 0.966. The second analysis
measured the consistency of the ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round Two,
excluding their Overall ADM scores. The Chronbach’s alpha on standardized items for
those four variables was 0.963.
The next analyses included the scores for Overall ADM. The third analysis
measured the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all participants in Round One.
The Chronbach’s alpha on standardized items for those five variables was 0.980. The
fourth analysis measured the consistency of all ordinal variable scores for all participants
in Round Two. The Chronbach’s alpha on standardized items for those five variables was
0.978.
Hypothesis Testing
Several Mann-Whitney tests and Wilcoxon tests were calculated to test the null
hypothesis - There was no difference in demonstrated ADM between pilots who received
specialized ADM training and pilots who received no specialized training, for flight
students enrolled in a baccalaureate program at ERAU.
Baseline ADM performance. A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the
null hypothesis - There was no difference in Round One Problem Comprehended
between the control and experimental groups. Figure 9 shows the results. There was no
difference in Round One Problem Comprehended between the control and experimental
groups.
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Figure 9. Round One Problem Comprehended scores, Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round One Problem Projected between the control and experimental
groups. Figure 10 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Problem
Projected between the control and experimental groups.

Figure 10. Round One Problem Projected scores, Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round One Decision Process Used between the control and experimental
groups. Figure 11 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Decision
Process Used between the control and experimental groups.
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Figure 11. Round One Decision Process Used scores, Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round One Timely Manner between the control and experimental groups.
Figure 12 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Timely Manner
between the control and experimental groups.

Figure 12. Round One Timely Manner scores, Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round One Overall ADM between the control and experimental groups.
Figure 13 shows the results. There was no difference in Round One Overall ADM
between the control and experimental groups.
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Figure 13. Round One Overall ADM scores, Control and Experimental groups.

Ending ADM performance. A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null
hypothesis - There was no difference in Round Two Problem Comprehended between the
control and experimental groups. Figure 14 shows the results. There was no difference in
Round Two Problem Comprehended between the control and experimental groups.

Figure 14. Round Two Problem Comprehended scores, Control and Experimental
groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round Two Problem Projected between the control and experimental
groups. Figure 15 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Problem
Projected between the control and experimental groups.
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Figure 15. Round Two Problem Projected scores, Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round Two Decision Process Used between the control and experimental
groups. Figure 16 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Decision
Process Used between the control and experimental groups.

Figure 16. Round Two Decision Process Used scores, Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round Two Timely Manner between the control and experimental groups.
Figure 17 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Timely Manner
between the control and experimental groups.
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Figure 17. Round Two Timely Manner scores, Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Round Two Overall ADM between the control and experimental groups.
Figure 18 shows the results. There was no difference in Round Two Overall ADM
between the control and experimental groups.

Figure 18. Round Two Overall ADM scores, Control and Experimental groups.

Change in ADM for the control group. A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test
the null hypothesis - There was no difference in Problem Comprehended between Round
One and Round Two for the control group. Figure 19 shows the results. There was a
difference in Problem Comprehended between Round One and Round Two for the
control group.
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Figure 19. Problem Comprehended scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control
group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Problem Projected between Round One and Round Two for the control
group. Figure 20 shows the results. There was no difference in Problem Projection
between Round One and Round Two for the control group.

Figure 20. Problem Projected scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control
group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Decision Process Used between Round One and Round Two for the control
group. Figure 21 shows the results. There was no difference in Decision Process Used
between Round One and Round Two for the control group.
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Figure 21. Decision Process Used scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control
group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Timely Manner between Round One and Round Two for the control group.
Figure 22 shows the results. There was no difference in Timely Manner between Round
One and Round Two for the control group.

Figure 22. Timely Manner scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Overall ADM between Round One and Round Two for the control group.
Figure 23 shows the results. There was no difference in Overall ADM between Round
One and Round Two for the control group.
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Figure 23. Overall ADM scores in Round One and Round Two for the Control group.

Change in ADM for the experimental group. A Wilcoxon test was calculated to
test the null hypothesis - There was no difference in in Problem Comprehended between
Round One and Round Two for the experimental group. Figure 24 shows the results.
There was no difference in Problem Comprehended between Round One and Round Two
for the experimental group.

Figure 24. Problem Comprehended scores in Round One and Round Two for the
Experimental group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Problem Projected between Round One and Round Two for the
experimental group. Figure 25 shows the results. There was no difference in Problem
Projected between Round One and Round Two for the experimental group.
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Figure 25. Problem Projected scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental
group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Decision Process Used between Round One and Round Two for the
experimental group. Figure 26 shows the results. There was no difference in Decision
Process Used between Round One and Round Two for the experimental group.

Figure 26. Decision Process Used scores in Round One and Round Two for the
Experimental group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Timely Manner between Round One and Round Two for the experimental
group. Figure 27 shows the results. There was no difference in Timely Manner between
Round One and Round Two for the experimental group.
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Figure 27. Timely Manner scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental
group.

A Wilcoxon test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Overall ADM between Round One and Round Two for the experimental
group. Figure 28 shows the results. There was no difference in Overall ADM between
Round One and Round Two for the experimental group.

Figure 28. Overall ADM scores in Round One and Round Two for the Experimental
group.

Comparing delta between control and experimental groups. A Mann-Whitney
test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no difference in Delta Problem
Comprehended (the change between Round One and Round Two) between the control
and experimental groups. Figure 29 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta
Problem Comprehended between the control and the experimental groups.
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Figure 29. Delta Problem Comprehended for the Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Delta Problem Projected between the control and experimental groups.
Figure 30 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Problem Projected between
the control and the experimental groups.

Figure 30. Delta Problem Projected for the Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Delta Decision Process Used between the control and experimental groups.
Figure 31 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Decision Process Used
between the control and the experimental groups.
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Figure 31. Delta Decision Process Used for the Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Delta Timely Manner between the control and experimental groups. Figure
32 shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Timely Manner between the
control and the experimental groups.

Figure 32. Delta Timely Manner for the Control and Experimental groups.

A Mann-Whitney test was calculated to test the null hypothesis - There was no
difference in Delta Overall ADM between the control and experimental groups. Figure 33
shows the results. There was no difference in Delta Overall ADM between the control
and the experimental groups.
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Figure 33. Delta Overall ADM for the Control and Experimental groups.
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Discussions
Significance of results. The data from this study did not produce many
statistically significant results or provide overwhelming support for the research
hypothesis. Several factors could have contributed to these results.
Experiment design factors.
Impact of variations in the sample. The population for the experiment was more
varied than originally intended by the researcher; thus, subsets of the population were
small. The variation in ratings and certificates yielded interesting results, both expected
and unexpected. Too few participants fell into the separate categories to make any
generalizations, but the variation between how participants with different certificates
fared suggest further research is required. More research questions include: (a) when is
the best time to introduce ADM training? and (b) how effective are the current MBT
curricula, compared to SBT curricula for teaching ADM?
Several comparisons can be made based on the researcher’s observations. Table 4
compares the Overall ADM scores and Deltas for the participants. Participants are
organized by whether they were part of the control or the experimental group and by
highest certification (CFIs were also commercial pilots but were separated into their own
category). Table 5 compares the same data for the participants but organizes them into
CFI and non-CFI participants.
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Table 4
Overall ADM and Delta Overall ADM for Participants Grouped By Highest
Certification: Control, Experimental, and All
Count

Round I

Round II

Delta

Student
Control
Experimental
All Student

3
1
4

1.21
1.13
1.19

1.39
1.25
1.35

0.18
0.13
0.17

Private
Control
Experimental
All Private

8
9
17

1.80
1.64
1.72

2.03
1.97
2.00

0.22
0.33
0.28

Commercial
Control
Experimental
All Commercial

3
2
5

1.75
2.29
1.97

2.17
2.17
2.17

0.42
-0.13
0.20

CFI
Control
Experimental
All CFI

1
3
4

2.13
2.25
2.22

1.75
1.97
1.92

-0.38
-0.28
-0.30

Regardless of whether they were given the experimental SBT ADM training, the
student pilots generally scored lower than the higher-certificated participants.
Anecdotally (the number of student pilots is small), the three control student pilot
participants averaged higher ADM scores in both rounds and a higher Delta than the lone
experimental student pilot participant. This suggests that the training provided could be
modified to better address student pilots’ level of experience.
The control private pilot participants averaged a high Delta of 0.22, suggesting
that private pilots benefit from ADM training whether it is MBT or SBT. The
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experimental private pilots averaged the highest Delta Overall ADM of the experimental
participants (0.33). The private pilots’ improvement supports other research speculating
that newly certificated private pilots would benefit greatly from ADM training (Adams,
Hamilton, Koonce, & Hwoschinsky, 2002). That the experimental private pilot
participants showed such great improvement suggests the experimental treatment was
particularly effective for these participants. The experimental private pilots’ higher Delta
suggests that SBT ADM training was more effective than the MBT received by the
control private pilot participants.
The three control commercial pilot participants averaged the highest Delta Overall
ADM score of the control group (0.42). The two experimental commercial pilot
participants averaged the highest Overall ADM score in Round One and tied with the
three Round Two control commercial pilot participants for the highest Round Two
Overall ADM scores. The experimental commercial pilot participants’ Round Two scores
were slightly lower than their Round One scores, though, resulting in a negative Delta
Overall ADM. These results are inconclusive on whether SBT ADM training benefits
commercial pilots more than MBT.
All of the CFI participants outperformed the other participants in the first AATD
sessions. However, the CFI participants regressed in the second AATD sessions leading
to negative Deltas (-0.38 and -0.28 for the control and experimental groups respectively).
Working as a CFI adds the task of providing instruction to the mental workload that a GA
pilot would otherwise be responsible for. The researcher therefore expected the CFIs to
exhibit more complete SA and more efficient ADM, as they did in the first AATD
sessions. Although the researcher expected that there would be less room for
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improvement for CFIs than for non-CFIs, the researcher still expected a positive change
in ADM. There was no clear reason why the CFIs regressed as a group in the second
AATD sessions, other than the small number of CFIs (N=4).

Table 5
Overall ADM and Delta Overall ADM for CFI and Non-CFI Participants: Control,
Experimental, and All
Count

Round I

Round II

Delta

CFI
Control
Experimental
All CFI

1
3
4

2.13
2.25
2.22

1.75
1.97
1.92

-0.38
-0.28
-0.30

Non-CFI
Control
Experimental
All Non-CFI

14
12
26

1.66
1.71
1.68

1.92
1.94
1.93

0.26
0.24
0.25

Figures 34, 35, and 36 show the distribution of participants’ Overall ADM scores
in a linear regression for the first and second AATD sessions, respectively, compared to
their total time. ADM literature led the researcher to expect that a participant’s
experience would increase with total time, leading to a correlation between a participant’s
ADM scores and his or her total time. The researcher also expected the SBT ADM
training to improve the participants’ ADM above what they would have demonstrated
without the training.
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Figure 34. Total time and Overall ADM for all participants in Round One
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Figure 35. Total time and Overall ADM for the control participants in Round Two
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Figure 36. Total time and Overall ADM for the experimental participants in Round Two

An examination of Figure 34 shows an expected positive correlation between total
time and overall ADM scores in the first AATD sessions. The positive correlation
between total time and overall ADM scores is also present in the second AATD sessions
as seen in Figures 35 and 36. However, a comparison of the two linear regressions in
Figures 35 and 36 with the regression in Figure 34 shows that the positive correlation
between total time and overall ADM is weaker for the control participants in the second
AATD session and almost non-existent for the experimental participants in the second
AATD session. The weakened correlation between increasing total time and improved
ADM for the experimental participants in Round Two suggests that the experimental
SBT ADM training was effective at developing lower time pilots’ ADM.
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Comparisons here are anecdotal since the sample for each experience level was
not sufficient to allow meaningful statistical analysis. Further research is needed to
determine whether these conclusions can be generalized.
G1000 proficiency. Participants’ success could have been influenced by their
proficiency with the G1000. All students had some experience with it, but the skill level
ranged from completely ignoring the system, through trying to use the very high
frequency (VHF) omnidirectional radio ranges (VORs) but not the GPS moving map,
through programming the entire flight plan into the MFD. Those who did not use the
moving map generally had a difficult time locating themselves at the beginning of the
scenario and did poorly when confronted with a significant decision later in the scenario.
Others persisted in inept attempts to use a particular feature of the G1000, resulting in a
higher workload and poorer ADM. Both IFR and VFR sectional charts were available to
the participants, and the AATD was limited to a single visual display. Participants could
choose whether to primarily use VFR or IFR charts or the G1000 or a combination of the
three to locate themselves. Some chose more effectively than others.
Types of ADM tested.
In-flight ADM. The scenarios used to test the participants’ ADM focused on inflight ADM. Some pre-flight ADM was required, in that participants had to decide how
thoroughly to review the planning information given to them, and how to manage their
materials effectively in the AATD’s pilot station. The extent to which the participants
chose to review and manage the preflight planning information did impact the
participants’ performance, particularly when it came to locating his or her initial position
and locating a diversion destination (if the scenario required it). However, the researcher
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eliminated most of the pre-flight ADM by giving the participant the completed pre-flight
planning documents. Therefore, weather information was given but the participant was
not invited to verbalize a go or no-go decision. Likewise, weight and balance,
performance calculations, and route and altitude choices were pre-determined for the
participants.
Quick decisions. Several participants remarked that their particular actions were
not “decisions.” When questioned further, some explained that they thought the action
was too immediate or too simple to be called a decision. This suggested that many
participants thought a decision must take a long time; another possible explanation is that
the participants simply did not know how to explain their thought processes.
Decision points in each scenario. Table 6 shows the Overall ADM scores grouped
by the scenario the participants flew in their first and second AATD sessions.

Table 6
Overall ADM Scores and Delta Overall ADM, by Scenario Flown in Rounds One and
Two
Scenario Number Round I Round II Delta
1
1.43
2.06
0.636
2
1.92
1.83
-0.083
3
1.84
1.83
-0.004
4
1.81
1.97
0.153

The four scenarios used to test the participants’ ADM included a variety of
decisions. This variety meant that no one ADM process was the most appropriate to all of
the scenarios. Generalizing the required ADM allowed the researchers to test for
improvements in ADM without contamination from rehearsal effect. Further research
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would be required to analyze the effectiveness of the SBT ADM training provided in this
experiment for improving different types of decision-making.
The first decision that had to be made for each scenario was to determine how to
fly the aircraft – what heading, altitude, and airspeed – and depended on the participants’
ability to determine their location. In Scenario 1, this decision is the focus of the scenario.
The participants were placed nearly 12 miles off shore over the Gulf of Mexico (due
West of the Cross City VOR) at an altitude of 4,500 feet. This location was several miles
off course, and put the participants beyond gliding distance of the shoreline in a singleengine aircraft. Had an engine failure occurred there, the participants would have had to
ditch in open water.
The expected outcome was that the participants would see that they were over
water, locate the nearest land, and turn immediately towards the nearest shoreline
regardless of whether that course gave them a short intercept to the planned route of
flight or necessitated back-tracking. The participants had the most difficulty with this
scenario in the first AATD sessions, perhaps because they did not expect the problem to
occur so soon in the scenario. ADM performance improved dramatically in the second
AATD sessions, though, with participants scoring higher in Scenario 1 than any of the
other scenarios (see Table 6).
Scenario 2 placed the participants on the planned route, 10 miles south of the
Cross City VOR, on the planned heading of 352 degrees at 4,500 feet. This location was
roughly mid-way between the departure airport and the destination. After reaching Cross
City, the planned route turned to the northwest then due west. However, stronger than
forecast winds (from the West at 60 knots) had been causing fuel to burn faster than
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planned so that the participants started the scenario with only 17 gallons of fuel (the flight
plan anticipated having 35 gallons remaining at that location). The fuel remaining would
not have been enough to get them to the next planned waypoint after Cross City Airport
given the winds and the minimum required fuel reserves.
The expected outcome was that the participants would decide to divert to a nearby
airport such as Cross City Airport to refuel. In Scenario 2, the participants had more time
to make a decision than they did in Scenario 1, depending on how quickly they noticed
the fuel and the winds. Participants performed the best in this scenario in the first AATD
sessions, but showed a slight regression in the second AATD sessions (see Table 6). This
type of decision-making may have been more familiar to the participants before the
experiment as current ERAU flight training emphasizes fuel management as part of
cross-country flight planning.
A mechanical malfunction and light rain provided the main decision points in
Scenario 3. Light rain began two minutes after the scenario started, although conditions
remained VFR. Four minutes after the scenario started, the engine started running
roughly. Engine roughness was indicated by variations in engine noise and RPMs
indicated on the tachometer. The fluctuations in engine power worsened if the participant
did not appear to notice them, and it persisted regardless of what the participants did to
troubleshoot in the air. The expected outcome was that the participants would divert into
a nearby airport before the engine failed or before encountering IFR conditions.
In Scenario 4, the participants had to decide what to do after their passenger
started to get nauseous. The researchers simulated turbulent conditions starting two
minutes into the scenario using the weather settings on the AATD. Then the researchers
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role-played as the participant’s “Auntie,” getting progressively sicker and eventually
vomiting. The participants were expected to divert to a nearby airport with the
appropriate facilities to help the passenger recover.
Unintended decisions. The researcher assumed that the participants would be able
to readily locate themselves with the resources available. This was not always the case,
and difficulties locating themselves had a consequently negative impact on some
participants’ ADM with respect to the intended decision points. Other participants
commented that they did not like being “dropped into the scenario in mid-air,” because
they felt it did not give them the time to prepare themselves or to set up the avionics the
way they usually do. Others simply adapted to the lack of preparatory time, commenting
that they used the bare minimum avionics to locate themselves and get on course before
they took the time to set up the avionics the way they usually would.
Maintaining realism of the scenario. Conducting the scenarios in an AATD had
many advantages. The AATD allowed the researcher to put the participant in scenarios
that would be potentially life threatening in an aircraft without actually impacting the
participants’ safety. The AATD was also a more practical platform for training ADM
since it was much more cost-effective to operate than a flight training device (FTD) or an
aircraft, and it was already set up in a lab with video and audio recording equipment.
Flying the AATD instead of an aircraft also allowed the researcher to control the
variables of weather and maintenance.
However, using the AATD instead of an FTD or an aircraft introduced a
challenge that is inherent in any simulation - maintaining the realism of the scenario. The
researchers took many precautions to make the AATD sessions as life-like as possible –
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to make the participants feel that they were in a real airplane dealing with that actual
scenario. It was hoped that the participants would become involved enough that they
would react as they would in a real airplane and gain equivalent experience. Several
factors interfered with the desired realism and possibly reduced the effectiveness of the
AATD sessions.
Several participants asked the researchers a question mid- scenario despite being
briefed that the researchers would merely be observing once the scenario started. “Where
am I?” was the most common question asked. Several participants also exhibited
behaviors such as laughing when it was inappropriate to the scenario, indicating that they
did not mentally accept the scenario as “real.” Other participants, confronted with
simulated engine roughness, noted the fluctuations in RPM and engine noise but told the
researcher during debrief that they thought it was “just the sim” and did nothing to
address the engine roughness.
Deviations from the scenario procedure.
AATD-induced deviations from the scenario procedure.
Un-programmed engine failure. The AATD induced unintended variations to
several participants’ scenarios. On one occasion when the researcher programmed engine
roughness, the AATD failed the engine instead. The researchers were unable to determine
why the AATD failed the engine and allowed the simulation to continue, scoring that
participant’s ADM based on the engine failure instead of the intended scenario. On
multiple occasions, the AATD displayed cloud cover that was thicker than programmed
by the researcher. The planned flight was to be conducted VFR and the researcher
therefore programmed a low scattered layer that should not have been an obstacle to
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descending VFR into an airport. However, several participants found themselves
apparently in a solid cloud layer when they descended into what looked like a clear space
between the scattered clouds on the visual display. This understandably changed those
participants’ ADM by introducing a VFR-into-IFR aspect to the scenario.
Clouds and Visibility. The researchers followed standardized procedures to set up
the visual environment for each AATD session. The procedures specified VFR clouds
and visibility for all four scenarios. One scenario called for rain, but the rain was not
associated with lower visibility or cloud bases. In a few scenarios, the AATD displayed
much thicker clouds than the researchers had programmed. The visibility also appeared
significantly lower than programmed during one session. These aberrations caused
several participants to request IFR clearance or to divert to an airport behind them.
Auto-zoom. Auto-zoom is a function of the G1000 that adjusts the zoom on the
moving map display by referencing ground speed. The faster the ground speed, the
farther out it zooms. An auto-zooming map can aid a pilot’s SA by zooming out to show
nearby airports and navigation aids. However, the researchers wanted to observe whether
the participants would effectively use the moving map as a source of information. The
researchers therefore intended to start everyone with the moving map zoomed in as
tightly as possible and auto-zoom turned off. Auto-zoom activated and zoomed the range
out on the moving map for some participants though, making it impossible to determine
whether those participants would have zoomed the display out on their own or whether
they would have tried to navigate without the moving map.
Operator-induced deviations from the scenario procedure. At two other times,
the researchers inadvertently changed the scenario. In one instance, the researcher briefed
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the participant enroute that the weather included a ceiling at 800 feet when the planned
briefing called for a scattered cloud layer at 800 feet. That participant then requested an
IFR clearance. A different participant started his scenario before the researchers realized
that the fuel had been inadvertently left at the levels for the scenario given to the previous
participant (which was low enough to require a fuel stop).
One participant’s behavior during the second AATD session suggested that the
participant probably talked with other study participants about the scenarios in their first
AATD sessions. The scenario for that participant’s second AATD session involved a sick
passenger. The participant seemed to anticipate that the passenger would be sick, asking
if she felt sick before the passenger had remarked on anything except the view. On one
occasion, the researchers decided not to present a participant with all of the decisions
called for by the scenario. The participant seemed to be overloaded already, and further
challenges seemed unproductive.
Treatment design factors. Limitations of the study strongly influenced the
design of the experimental treatment. Constraints included the participants’ schedules, the
study’s condensed timeline, and budget. By necessity, the experimental treatment was
very condensed, compared to other SBT ADM training efforts. The treatment consisted
of one session lasting one and one-half hours. It was conducted in a classroom using a
PowerPoint presentation as a visual aid, and some time elapsed before the participants
completed their second AATD sessions.
Treatment would likely have been more effective if the resources had been
available to conduct more than one session of ADM training. Harnessing participants’
involvement in the material was limited to measures the researcher could take in the
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treatment session. Increasing the participants’ involvement by assigning homework or
reading (for example, reading about ADM models or ADM-related accidents) beforehand
could have helped them absorb the information. Also, the treatment would likely have
been more effective if the guided discussion had been followed immediately by a handson application in a scenario in an AATD. Some participants waited several days after
completing the treatment before schedules allowed them to complete the second AATD
session.
Researcher and instrument factors.
Bias. The author conducted all of the AATD scenarios (with the help of another
researcher), conducted the ADM training for the experimental group, and was the sole
scorer for all of the participants. The fact that the same person conducted all aspects of
the experiment reduced the researcher’s impartiality. Knowing whether each participant
was in the control or experimental group could have biased the researcher’s scoring. The
researcher also knew some of the participants through work as a flight instructor, others
through student groups; this familiarity created another opportunity for bias to affect the
results. Using multiple graders, who did not conduct any of the experimental training, to
score the participants would have allowed inter-rater reliability to remove this bias.
Scoring. Quantifying a person’s ADM is difficult by nature. The scoring method
used in this experiment to quantify each participant’s ADM was purposefully vague in
order to lessen the impact of a single scorer’s mistakes. The options of 1, 2, or 3 did not
discriminate the participants’ ADM as much as a 5-point or 7-point scale would have, but
it allowed the scorer to reliably assess a participant’s ADM. A 5-point or 7-point scale
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would require very definitive criteria and several independent scorers to increase the
validity and reliability of the assessments.
Each participant received several scores per AATD session. The researcher then
averaged the scores for each participant to calculate an Overall ADM score for that
participant in that session. This averaging process further smoothed out any scoring
errors the researcher may have made.
Instrument reliability. The researcher conducted four Chronbach’s alpha analyses
to measure the research instrument’s reliability. These analyses were especially
important given some of the researcher’s choices in designing the study. The study’s use
of a single person to train and score the participants created the possibility of bias and
negated inter-rater reliability. The researcher also chose to use a relatively vague 3-point
scale to score ADM. Furthermore, the literature review did not reveal a precedent for
averaging scores for different aspects of ADM into an Overall ADM score.
The Chronbach’s alpha analyses revealed that the instrument was extremely
reliable despite the single scorer, vague scoring method, and unprecedented Overall
ADM scores. Chronbach’s alpha is measured on a scale of 0 to 1.0. An accepted “rule of
thumb” for determining what is an acceptable alpha is: α > 0.7 acceptable, α > 0.8 good,
and α > 0.9 excellent (George & Mallery, 2011, p. 231).
The Chronbach’s alpha for the ordinal scores excluding Overall ADM in Round
One and Round Two were excellent – 0.966 and 0.963 respectively. The Chronbach’s
alpha for the ordinal scores including Overall ADM in Round One and Round Two of
0.980 and 0.978 respectively were even higher. The researcher had expected the

97
Chronbach’s alpha to be higher when the Overall ADM scores were included because the
Overall ADM scores averaged scores that had already been shown to be highly reliable.
Impact of video quality on data collection. All AATD sessions were recorded
using two cameras installed in the High Altitude Lab (HAL), headset microphones, and a
portable audio recorder. The video recorded by the two cameras in the HAL was good
enough to see what the participant was doing, but the poor lighting and resolution made it
difficult or impossible to tell what kind of chart they were using or what any of the
displays were showing. The cameras also did not record sounds that were not on the
microphones. This means that audio cues like rain or changes in engine RPM were lost in
the video recording. This made reviewing the footage more difficult. Some details that
could have enabled the researcher to determine what the participant was thinking were
lost in the video and could not be accurately recalled from the researcher’s personal
memories.
Reviewing the video and audio recordings after the participants completed the
scenarios would have been easier, had the researcher modified the data collection device.
The inclusion of a time log on the data collection device to record start and stop times
and times of significant events would have facilitated observations both during the
session and during later review. Recording the ground tracks would have facilitated
evaluation particularly for the participants whose scenario started over water.
Conclusions
The research hypothesis of this study was: there was a difference in demonstrated
ADM ability between pilots who received scenario-based ADM training and pilots who
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did not receive scenario-based ADM training, for flight students enrolled in a
baccalaureate program at ERAU.
Statistical tests showed no significant difference between the control and
experimental groups’ ADM ability for any of the variables in the first AATD sessions.
Although the experimental group exhibited higher mean scores than the control group for
all variables in the first AATD sessions, the two groups exhibited statistically equivalent
ADM ability. This meant that statistical differences in the two groups’ ADM ability in
the second AATD sessions did not result from an a priori difference.
The expected outcome of the treatment was that the experimental group would
exhibit statistically better ADM ability than the control group in the second AATD
sessions. Statistical tests showed no significant difference between the control and
experimental groups’ ADM ability in the second AATD sessions. Despite the
experimental treatment, the ADM ability of the control and the experimental groups
remained statistically equivalent.
The researcher expected both the control and the experimental groups to improve
on their ADM scores from their first AATD sessions to their second AATD sessions. As
expected, both the control and experimental groups showed higher mean scores for all
variables in the second AATD session. Although both groups showed higher mean scores
in the second AATD sessions, most of the differences were statistically insignificant.
The only statistically significant difference was in Problem Comprehended for the
control group. Had alpha been set to 0.1 instead of 0.05, the differences in Projection (p =
0.085) and Overall ADM (p = 0.089) for the control group would have been significant.
The difference in Problem Comprehended (p = 0.104) for the experimental group would
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have been close to significance. The general absence of statistically significant
differences indicated that the experimental treatment had no significant impact on the
participants’ demonstrated ADM ability.
However, the treatment appeared to have a practically significant impact on the
experimental groups’ ADM. The experimental group’s average Overall ADM improved
from 1.82 in the first AATD session to 1.95 in the second AATD session (see Table 7).
Although the experimental group’s Delta (0.13) was smaller than the control group’s
Delta, the experimental group’s Overall ADM scores were higher than the control
group’s Overall ADM scores in both the first and second AATD sessions (see Table 7).

Table 7
Practical Comparison of the Control and Experimental Groups, Overall ADM

Control
Experimental

First AATD Session
1.69
1.82

Second AATD Session
1.91
1.95

Delta Overall ADM
.21
.13

The experimental group also scored higher than the control group in the second AATD
session in Decision Process Used, Timely Manner, and Overall ADM.
It is possible that the size and the diversity of the population sample resulted in a
Type II error. The population sample was small for an experiment of this nature (N = 30).
Although 30 subjects is a generally accepted minimum for statistical significance, using
only the minimum number of participants and including participants with such a range of
certifications and hours logged could have prevented a statistical difference in Overall
ADM between the control and experimental groups.

100
Recommendations
The data from this study did not statistically support incorporating SBT ADM
training into GA flight training. However, previous research supports the hypotheses that
ADM can be taught and that SBT is more effective than MBT for teaching ADM. The
practical results of this study indicate that further research is warranted.
Recommendations from this study thus include recommendations for further research and
suggested improvements to the experiment design.
Further research and analysis. Variations in the study’s sample raised many
questions about ADM training with respect to differences in total time and certifications
held. However, subsets of the sample for different certifications and total times were too
small to allow statistical analysis of those factors’ impact on demonstrated ADM ability.
Repeating this experiment with larger samples would allow meaningful analysis of the
treatment’s impact on ADM for GA pilots with different certifications and total times.
Researchers could derive significant implications for effective ADM training for pilots at
different experience levels and aid in development of graduated ADM training, which
could then be integrated into GA flight training.
Further analysis of the participants’ ADM scores by scenarios would enable
researchers to derive implications on the effectiveness of ADM training for different
types of decisions. This would require a sample of at least 30 participants for each
scenario.
Suggested improvements for this study. This study had several limitations that
significantly impacted the design of the experiment, the treatment design, the data
analysis, and the results. Improvements for this study would address these limitations.
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Experiment design factors. Time and budget prevented the researcher from using
a larger sample for the experiment. The researcher also used ERAU students exclusively
because they were the most convenient. This study would benefit from using a larger
sample from a more diverse GA pilot population. The experiment would also provide
better results if the AATD sessions were recorded using cameras with higher quality
video and audio. Poor lighting, resolution, and sound quality hindered the review of the
AATD sessions and made scoring more difficult.
Treatment design factors. Time and budget constrained the scope of the treatment
the researcher could provide. The study would likely produce more conclusive results if
the treatment were expanded beyond a single training session. The treatment would also
be more effective if the researcher could integrate an AATD session into the end of
treatment, as this would allow the participants to immediately practice the ADM
processes they discussed in the treatment.
Bias. The researcher conducted all of the AATD scenarios, conducted the training
for the experimental group, and scored all of the participants. The researcher also knew
some of the participants through work as a flight instructor and through student groups.
Chronbach’s alpha analyses indicated that bias did not impact the reliability of the data in
this study. Using multiple raters (whose knowledge of the participants was limited to
what they observed in the AATD sessions) to blindly score the participants would have
allowed the use of inter-rater reliability to make the results even more reliable.

102
References
About SAFE. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.safepilots.org/about-safe/
Adams, R. J. (1992a). How expert pilots think. In Adams, R. J. & Adams, C. A.,
Workshop on aeronautical decision making (ADM): Vol. II – plenary session with
presentations and proposed action plan (DOT/FAA/RD-92/14, II). Retrieved
from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a257066.pdf
Adams, R. J. (1992b). Enhanced ADM training alternatives. In Adams, R. J. & Adams,
C. A., Workshop on aeronautical decision making (ADM): Vol. II – plenary
session with presentations and proposed action plan (DOT/FAA/RD-92/14, II).
Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a257066.pdf
Adams, R. J. & Adams, C. A. (1992). Workshop on aeronautical decision making
(ADM): Vol. II – plenary session with presentations and proposed action plan
(DOT/FAA/RD-92/14, II). Retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a257066.pdf
Adams, R. J., Hamilton, B. A., Koonce, J. M., & Hwoschinsky, P. V. (2002). Decisionmaking styles associated with accidents: Defining the high risk pilot. Proceedings
of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting, 46, 948. doi:
10.1177/154193120204601203
Adams, R., & Thompson, J. (1987). Aeronautical decision making for helicopter pilots
(DOT/FAA/PM-86/45). Retrieved from
http://www.avhf.com/html/Library/ADM_for_Helicopter_Pilots.pdf
Aircraft Owners and Pilot’s Association (AOPA). (2009). 2009 Nall report: Accident
trends and factors for 2008. Frederick, MD: Air Safety Institute.
Aircraft Owners and Pilot’s Association (AOPA). (2010). 2010 Nall report: The Joseph
T. Nall report of accident trends and factors. Frederick, MD: Air Safety Institute.
Babbitt, J. R. (2011). Above and beyond: Attitude determines your altitude. FAA Safety
Briefing, 50(4), 10-13.
Baker, S. P., Qiang, Y., Rebok, G. W., & Li, G. (2008). Pilot error in air carrier mishaps:
Longitudinal trends among 558 reports, 1983-2002. Aviation Space
Environmental Medicine, 79(1), 2-6. doi: 10.3357/ASEM.2200.2008
Beringer, D. B., & Schvaneveldt, R. (2002). Priorities of weather information in various
phases of flight [Abstract]. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society Annual Meeting, 46, 86-90. doi: 10.1177/154193120204600118

103
Brown, M. W. (2006). System safety in modern flight training. FAA Aviation News,
45(1), 1-7.
Buch, G., Lawton, R. S., & Livack, G. S. (Eds.) (1987). Aeronautical decision making for
instructor pilots (DOT/FAA/PM-86/44). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Retrieved from
http://www.avhf.com/html/Library/ADM_for_Instructor_Pilots.pdf
Cessna Aircraft Company. (2005). Information manual: Skyhawk SP Model 172S Nav III
avionics option. Wichita, KS: Author.
Center for General Aviation Research (CGAR). (2005). CGAR 2.1. Retrieved from
http://www.cgar.org/Default.aspx
Center for General Aviation Research (CGAR). (2011). 10th anniversary annual report.
Retrieved from http://www.cgar.org/newsletters/Annual%20Report%202011.pdf
Deitch, E. L. (2001). Learning to land: A qualitative examination of pre-flight and inflight decision-making processes in expert and novice aviators (Unpublished
dissertation). Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg,
Virginia. URN: etd-12122001-183807
Diehl, A. E. (1992). Does cockpit management training reduce aircrew error? In Adams,
R. J. & Adams, C. A., Workshop on aeronautical decision making (ADM): Vol. II
– plenary session with presentations and proposed action plan (DOT/FAA/RD92/14, II). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a257066.pdf
Diehl, A. E., Hwoschinsky, P. V., Lawton, R. S., & Livack, G. S. (Eds.) (1987).
Aeronautical decision making for student and private pilots (DOT/FAA/PM86/41). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Retrieved from
http://www.avhf.com/html/Library/ADM_for_Student_and_Private_Pilots.pdf
Dillman, B. G., & Fanjoy, J. R. (2006). Utilizing situational judgment tests (SJT) for pilot
decision-making. International Journal of Applied Aviation Studies, 6(1), 145154. Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/arc/programs/academy/
journal/pdf/Spring_2006.pdf
Endsley, M. R. (2000). Theoretical underpinnings of situational awareness: A critical
review. In Endsley, M. R. & Garland, D. J. (Eds.) Situation awareness analysis
and measurement. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. doi:
10.1177/154193120204601203
Endsley, M. R., & Garland, D. J. (2000). Pilot situation awareness training in general
aviation. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual
Meeting, 44(11), 357-360. doi: 10.1177/154193120004401107

104
Enrollment, ERAU-News, Embry-Riddle. (2012). Retrieved from
http://news.erau.edu/media-resources/facts-figures/enrollment/index.html
Ericsson, K. A. (1992). Methodology for studying and training expertise. In Adams, R. J.
& Adams, C. A., Workshop on aeronautical decision making (ADM): Vol. II –
plenary session with presentations and proposed action plan (DOT/FAA/RD92/14, II). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a257066.pdf
FAA-industry training standards (FITS) program plan. (2003). Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (1991). Aeronautical decision making (AC 6022). Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/advisory_circulars/index.cfm/go/docume
nt.information/documentID/22624
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2008a). Aviation instructor’s handbook (FAAH-8083-9A). Washington, DC: Author.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2008b). Pilot’s handbook of aeronautical
knowledge (FAA-H-8083-25A). Washington, DC: Author.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2010a) Flight instructor instrument practical
test standards for airplane and helicopter (FAA-S-8081-9D with change 1).
Washington, DC: Author.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2010b). Instrument rating practical test
standards for airplane, helicopter, and powered lift (FAA-S-8081-4E with
changes 1, 2, and 3). Washington, DC: Author.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2011a). Commercial pilot practical test
standards for airplane (SEL, MEL, SES, MES) (FAA-S-8081-12C). Washington,
DC: Author.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2011b). Private pilot practical test standards
for airplane (SEL, MEL, SES, MES) (FAA-S-8081-14B). Washington, DC:
Author.
FITS master instructor syllabus: TAA scenario based instructor guide (version 2.0).
(2006). Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/training/generic/media/instructor.
pdf
Frasca International, Inc. (2010). Frasca International - products - fixed wing piston Mentor G1000 [sic]. Retrieved from
http://www.frasca.com/products/mentorg100.php#

105
French, J., Blickensderfer, B., Ayers, F., & Connolly, T. (2005). FITS combined task 1&2
final report for the Embry Riddle Aeronautical University effort. Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/research/media/erau.pdf
Garmin G1000®. (2012). Retrieved from
https://buy.garmin.com/shop/shop.do?pID=6420&ra=true
General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA). (2011). General aviation:
Statistical databook and industry outlook. Retrieved from
http://www.gama.aero/media-center/industry-facts-and-statistics/statisticaldatabook-and-industry-outlook
George, D., & Mallery, P. (2011). SPSS for Windows step by step: A simple guide and
reference 18.0 update (11th ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Glista, T. (2003). FITS-FAA/industry training standards: Part 1 overview. FAA Aviation
News, 42(2), 1-4.
Helmreich, R. L., Merritt, A. C., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1999). The evolution of Crew
Resource Management training in commercial aviation. International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 9(1), 19-32. Retrieved from
http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/group/helmreichlab/publications/pubfil
es/Pub235.pdf
Helmreich, R. L., & Foushee, C. (2010). Why CRM? Empirical and theoretical bases for
human factors training. In Kanki, B. G., Helmreich, R. L., & Anca, J. (Eds.),
Crew resource management (2nd ed.). Burlington, MA, USA: Academic Press.
Howell, J., Miller, P., Park, H. L., Sattler, D., Schack, T., Spery, E., et al. (2005).
Reliability and validity: Writing@CSU. Retrieved from the Colorado State
University Department of English website:
http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/relval/
Hunter, D. R. (2003). Measuring general aviation pilot judgment using a situational
judgment technique. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 13(4),
373-386. Retrieved from
http://www.avhf.com/html/Library/Tech_Reports/IJAP_Situational_Judgment.pdf
International Civil Aviation Organization. (2009). Safety management manual (2nd ed.).
Retrieved from
http://www2.icao.int/en/ism/Guidance%20Materials/DOC_9859_FULL_EN.pdf

106
Irving, J. (1992). Bootstrapping expertise: What makes the expert pilot decision maker
expert and why? In Adams, R. J. & Adams, C. A., Workshop on aeronautical
decision making (ADM): Vol. II – plenary session with presentations and
proposed action plan (DOT/FAA/RD-92/14, II). Retrieved from
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a257066.pdf
Jensen, R. S. (1982). Pilot judgment: Training and evaluation. Human Factors, 24(1), 6173. doi: 10.1177/001872088202400107
Jensen, R. S. (1989). Aeronautical decision making – Cockpit resource management.
(DOT/FAA/PM-86/46). Retrieved from
http://www.avhf.com/html/Library/Aeronautical_Decision_Making_Cockpit_Res
ource_Management.pdf
Jensen, R. S., & Adrion, J. (1988). Aeronautical decision making for commercial pilots
(DOT/FAA/PM-86/42). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA). Retrieved from
http://www.avhf.com/html/Library/ADM_for_Commercial_Pilots.pdf
Jensen, R. S., Adrion, J., & Lawton, R. S. (1987). Aeronautical decision making for
instrument pilots (DOT/FAA/PM-86/43). Washington, DC: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA). Retrieved from
http://www.avhf.com/html/library/ADM_for_Instrument_Pilots.pdf
Kobus, D. A., Proctor, S., Bank, T., & Holste, S. (2000). Effects of experience and
uncertainty during dynamic decision making. Proceedings of the Human Factors
and Ergonomics Society.
Kochan, J. A., Jensen, R. S., Chubb, G. P., & Hunter, D. R. (1997). A new approach to
aeronautical decision-making: The expertise method (DOT/FAA/AM-97/6).
Washington, DC: Federal Aviation Administration.
Lee, J. R., Fanjoy, R. O., & Dillman, B. G. (2005). Sorenson best paper award recipient:
The effects of safety information on aeronautical decision making. Journal of Air
Transportation, 10(3).
Li, W.-C. & Harris, D. (2005). Aeronautical decision making: Instructor-pilot evaluation
of ﬁve mnemonic methods. Aviation, Space, and Environment Medicine 76(12),
1156 – 1161.
Li, W.-C. & Harris, D. (2008).The evaluation of the effect of a short aeronautical
decision-making training program for military pilots. The International Journal of
Aviation Psychology, 18(2), 135-152.
McMahon, A. (2009). Making it fun: Scenario-based training is a great and effective way
to train today’s pilots. FAA Aviation News, 48(4), 8-11.

107
Molesworth, B., Wiggins, M. W., & O’Hare, D. (2006). Improving pilots’ risk
assessment skills in low-flying operations: The role of feedback and experience.
Accident Analysis and Prevention, 38, 954-960.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2006). Annual review of aircraft accident
data: U.S. general aviation, calendar year 2006 (NTSB/ARG-10/01).
Washington, DC: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2011a). Review of U.S. civil aviation
accidents, 2007–2009. Annual Review (NTSB/ARA-11/01). Washington, DC:
Author.
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2011b). Table 5: Accidents, fatalities,
and rates, 1991-2010, 14 CFR 121, scheduled service (airlines). Retrieved from
http://www.ntsb.gov/data/aviation_stats.html
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2011c). Transportation safety: General
Aviation safety. http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl-2.html
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). (2012). General aviation safety: Climbing
to the next level. Retrieved from
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2012/GA_safety/index.html
O’Brien, K., & Ballenger, K. (2006). Introducing the FAA Safety Team. FAA Aviation
News 45(2), 1-4.
O’Connor, P., Hahn, R. G., & Nullmeyer, R. (2010). The military perspective. In Kanki,
B. G., Helmreich, R. L., & Anca, J. Crew resource management (2nd edition).
Burlington, MA, USA: Academic Press.
O’Hare, D., Mullen, N., & Arnold. A. (2009). Enhancing aeronautical decision making
through case-based reflection. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology,
20(1), 48-58.
Robertson, C. L., Petros, T. V., Schumacher, P. M., McHorse, C. A., & Ulrich, J. M.
(2006). Evaluating the effectiveness of FITS training. Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/research/media/und.pdf
Robertson, C. L., & Summers, M. (2007). Evaluating the satisfaction and quality of FITS
flight training. Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/research/media/satisfaction.pdf
Schriver, A. T., Morrow, D. G., Wickens, C. D., & Talleur, D. A. (2008). Expertise
differences in attentional strategies related to pilot decision making. Human
Factors, 50(6), 864-878. doi: 10.1518/001872008X374974

108
Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE). (2011a). Pilot training reform
symposium preliminary report. Retrieved from
http://www.pilottrainingreform.org/documents/Symposium_Prelim_Report_06Jun
2011.pdf
Society of Aviation and Flight Educators (SAFE). (2011b). Update on training reform
symposium: Preliminary report and stakeholder comments. Retrieved from
http://www.pilottrainingreform.org/documents/SAFE_Training_Reform_Progress
_Report_31Oct11.pdf
SRM Scenario [PowerPoint slides]. (2009). Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/presentations/
Stowell, R. (2011). Symposium acts as springboard for training reform. Retrieved from
http://www.pilottrainingreform.org/2011/05/symposium-acts-as-springboard-fortraining-reform/
Student Demographics, ERAU-News, Embry-Riddle. (2012). Retrieved from
http://news.erau.edu/media-resources/facts-figures/studentdemographics/index.html
Sumwalt, R. L., & Watson, A. W. (1995). ASRS incident data reveal details of flightcrew performance during aircraft malfunctions. Flight Safety Digest 14(10), 1-7.
Vision & mission statement. (2012). Retrieved from http://www.safepilots.org/aboutsafe/vision-mission-statements/
Wiegmann, D. A., Goh, J., & O’Hare, D. (2002). The role of situation assessment and
flight experience in pilots’ decisions to continue visual flight rules flight into
adverse weather. Human Factors, 44(2), 189-197. doi:
10.1518/0018720024497871
Wiggins, M., & O’Hare, D. (2003). Weatherwise: Evaluation of a cue-based training
approach for the recognition of deteriorating weather conditions during flight.
Human Factors, 45(2), 337-345. doi: 10.1518/hfes.45.2.337.27246
Wright , R. A. (2002). White paper: Changes in general aviation flight operations and
their impact on system safety and flight training. Retrieved from
http://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/guidance/media/whitepaper.doc
Wright, R. A. (2004). General aviation safety in the second century: The flight training
challenge. FAA Aviation News, 43(4), 4-5.
Wright, R. A. (2009). The current state of flight instruction and flight training in the
United States: A call for industry action. Retrieved from
http://www.pilottrainingreform.org/documents/PTR_WP_Wright.pdf

109
Wright, R. A. (2011). Training’s future: Replacing the FITS program means improving
and refining its emphasis on enhanced decision making and automation
management. Aviation Safety 31(1), 8-11.

110

Appendix A
Permission to Conduct Research

111
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Application for IRB Approval
Determination Form
11-167

Principle Investigator: Dr. Guy Smith
Other Investigators: Mariko Doskow, Michele Halleran, Michael Wiggins

Project Title: Classroom and lab-based experiment to support a thesis

Submission Date: October 2, 2011

Determination Date: October 28, 2011

Review Board Use Only
Initial Reviewer: Teri Vigneau/Bert Boquet
Exempt: X Yes
Approved: X Yes

___ No
___ No

Comments: The purpose of this project is to measure the effectiveness of scenario-based
training for accelerating improvement of judgment. There will be one control group with
no ADM (Aeronautical Decision Making) training and an experimental group with ADM
training.
Part of the study will be conducted in a classroom and part will take place in an AATD
(Mentor Advanced) fixed (non-moving) flight simulator. There should be no risk to
participants other than routine training so it may be considered exempt. [Teri Vigneau
10-24-11]
This falls under the university’s scope of operations and can be considered exempt. [Bert
Boquet 10-24-11]
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CONSENT FORM
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
I consent to participating in the research project entitled:
Improving Aeronautical Decision Making Ability through Specialized Training
The principle investigator of the study is:
Dr. Guy Smith
Mariko Doskow, First student investigator
Prof. Michele Halleran, Advisor
Dr. Michael Wiggins, Advisor
The purpose of this study is to measure pilot judgment. The participants will complete
two separate scenarios in a Mentor AATD, a fixed-based (non-moving) flight simulator.
Some participants will participate in an additional classroom session. Participants must
have at least a student pilot certificate. Risks associated with participation are
comparable to ERAU training in a fixed base simulator or classroom. Potential benefits
include a valuable learning experience and an input for a student’s resume.
Total time commitment for participants will total between 3 and 4.5 hours. Participants
will be paid at a rate of $7.50 per hour. Participants have the right to refuse participation
at any time with no penalty or prejudice against them; however, participants who do not
complete all portions of the study (regardless of whether they are asked to participate in
two or all three sessions) will not be compensated. All personal information and
experimental data collected for this study will be kept confidential.
The individual above, or their research assistants, have explained the purpose of the
study, the procedures to be followed, and the expected duration of my participation.
Possible benefits of the study have been described, as have alternative procedures, if such
procedures are applicable and available.
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding
the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction.
Furthermore, I understand that I am free to withdraw consent at any time and to
discontinue participation in the study without prejudice to me.
Finally, I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. I sign it
freely and voluntarily. A copy has been given to me.
Date: _____________
Name (please print): ______________________________________
(Participant)
Signed: __________________________________________
(Participant)
Signed: __________________________________________
(Researcher/Assistant)
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PILOT BRIEFING

Thank you for volunteering to be a test pilot for this research project! The purpose of this
study is to measure pilot judgment. The participants will complete two separate scenarios
in a Mentor AATD, a fixed-based (non-moving) flight simulator. This Mentor is similar
to the ones used for ADF training during ERAU’s instrument training course. Please keep
in mind that we are not grading you – we are collecting data that will be de-identified and
used to make future training improvements.
We know that you will be tempted to tell your friends and colleagues about your
experience. We ask that you refrain from discussing what you do, though. It is critical
that all participants begin each scenario without any extra information in order to draw
valid conclusions from this research.
Each scenario begins in level cruise enroute on the VFR cross country flight detailed in
the flight plan and documents provided (KRSW to KHRT, departing Mon Oct 31, 2011).
We hope that you have fun during this session. Fly safe and enjoy the challenge!
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Guided Discussion/Debrief
Date:
Scenario:
Total time:
1. What was your first concern? Next concern?

2. What was your first action?

3. Did you feel that you had any decisions to make?

4. What choices were you considering?

5. What resources did you use to help decision making?

6. What were your choices in the end?

7. What was your final decision? Why?

8. What concerns did you have after you chose to …?
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Scenario 2 – Strong Westerly Headwinds Late in a Cross Country
AATD Setup Procedure
1.
2.
3.

Complete AATD Startup Checklist.
Wait for the communication channel to be reached, the screen will change colors
until arriving at the default runway 7L DAB
Follow 172 setup checklists to initiate glass cockpit, ensure cockpit controls are
set up for flight and ready for the scenario to begin.
Flaps – Up
Mixture – Rich
Throttle – 2400 RPM
Trim – Neutral
Electric Switches – Off
Master Switch – On
Avionics Switch – On

4.

5.

6.

Standby Battery – On
Ignition – Both
Parking Brake – In
Standby Static Source – In
Fuel Shutoff – In
Fuel Selector – Both
FREEZE Red Button – On
On MFD – Press ENTER

Setup scenario on Gist laptop:
a. Initial environment:
i. Cloud Layer 1: Bkn 300-1,500’. Cloud Layer 2: Sct 7,000-10,000’
ii. Wind @ Sfc, 2,000’: 270@20. Wind @ 4,500’: 270@60
iii. Day
iv. VIS ON @ 20sm, and Scud OFF
b. Initial fuel on board: 17gallons
c. Initial position: KAJYE (66 NM north of PIE/37 south of CTY on V35)
d. Initial attitude:
i. Wings level, pitch +2*
ii. Heading 352*, altitude 4,500’, Airspeed 110 kts
Settle the subject in the simulator chair. Have the subject start the scenario.
a. After subject is seated, start recording
i. Start cameras
ii. Start audio recorder
b. “When you’re ready, go ahead and start the scenario by pressing the red
pause/unpause button”
Scenario Timeline:
a. Subject starts the scenario; no further action by the HAL operator.
a. Subject notices where they are, low fuel and GS (Problem detected)
b. Subject projects whether or not can make the destination
c. Participant starts decision process: divert, checklists, communicate
d. After on a course for :03 (or on original course for :30), tell the participant
to freeze the Mentor. “Please press the red pause/unpause button.”
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Complete the Guided Discussion. “Thank you for your time. You will be
compensated for this session (1 hour) after completing all sessions.”
8.
Repeat steps 3-4 to reset the simulator controls to flight ready conditions.
9.
Repeat steps 5-7 for next subject.
When the testing day is concluded, complete AATD shutdown checklist
7.

